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[H]ow and where I play at being one [a lesbian] is the way in which
that "being" gets established, instituted, circulated, and confinned.1
* Professor of Law and Martha Traylor Research Scholar, Seton Hall University
School of Law. The author is indebted to Michelle Ghali, Rachel Godsil, Louise Halper,
Diane Meier, Frank Pasquale, Clarice Roberts, and Sarah Waldeck for their helpful
conversations. Mae Kuykendall and Michael Poreda provided very helpful comments on
drafts. I am grateful for the skillful research assistance of John Devendorf, Jacob Hudnut,
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[Tihe development of an ideal or inwardly generated identity gives a
new and crucial importance to recognition. My own identity crucially
depends on my dialogical relations with others.2
We often think of identity as our and ours alone. But in significant
measure, individual identity is produced, confirmed, and reproduced in
microperformances-individual behaviors, interpretations, and small and
large group social processes that are carried out and observed through
specific interactions in everyday life. An individual's identity is
fundamentally dialogical. As philosopher Charles Taylor argues,
We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and
hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human
languages of expression .... [W]e learn these modes of expression
through exchanges with others .... The genesis of the human mind is
in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes
on his or her own, but dialogical.
3
At the same time, Taylor observes, "a person or group of people can
suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them
mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of
themselves., 4 The dialogical process of identity (re)production conveys
and (re)creates not only identity but normal or stigmatized status. The good
news here is that stigma is therefore no more permanently and irrevocably
fixed than is identity itself.
Attention to these ongoing processes of identity formation and
reproduction can help us to better understand some aspects of the same-sex
marriage controversy. When same-sex couples choose to be visible, their
presence challenges a number of social norms, and sometimes legal norms
as well, with regard to sex, gender, and sexual orientation, as well as the
status of that couple and other same-sex couples. Those norms can shift.
Appreciating how the microperformances of identity by same-sex couples
Michael Poreda, Kate Riopel, and David Uibelhoer. The opinions expressed herein are those
of the author and not of Seton Hall University, the Catholic University of New Jersey. I
dedicate this article to the memory of my friend Louise Halper. How often she helped me
see more clearly!
1. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OuT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 13, 18 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
2. CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHics OF AuTHENTIcrrY 47-48 (1991).
3. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MuLTICuLTURALIsM: EXAMINING
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25 (Amy Guttman ed., 1994) (citing GEORGE HERBERT
MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (1934)).
4. Id.
MICROPERFORMANCES OF IDENTITY
function in the larger Kulturkampf may lead the reader to reflect in a subtler
and perhaps fresh way on some of the current dynamics in what Katherine
Franke has lately called the politics of same-sex marriage politics.
5
Part I of this article briefly reviews some familiar identity categories
that we use in thinking about marriage in contemporary United States
culture-sex, gender, and sexual orientation. Part I also introduces the idea
of visible traits and visible performances as markers of these identity
categories; for perceptible gender traits are closely associated with
quotidian identity performances of sex and sexual orientation as well as of
gender. Visible same-sex couples, in their microperformances as couples,
challenge a number of normative identity binaries around sex, gender, and
sexual orientation.
Part II explores the idea of microperformances of identity more
generally. Part II.A considers some of the writings of sociologist Erving
Goffman.6 His work is helpful not only because of his insistent focus on
microinteractions, but also because he describes the way in which an
individual and those who observe him/her and with whom s/he interacts in
everyday performances of self continually and mutually negotiate the
system of interpretation according to which the individual and the audience
generate and interpret behavioral cues around their mutually performed
identities. Goffman's careful descriptions of small interpersonal
interactions suggest that such performances always contain the potential not
simply for appropriate deployment of an existing verbal and gestural
vocabulary but for (as Judith Butler would put it decades later) a
misappropriation of that vocabulary.7 This misappropriation has the
potential to shift the significance and therefore the identity-revealing and
(re)producing potential of specific behaviors and traits, and thus eventually
5. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 236, 237-38 (2006).
6. For this article the author reviewed all or part of: ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION
RITUAL: ESSAYS IN FACE-To-FACE BEHAVIOR (2005); ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963); ERVING GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS: TWO
STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERACTION (1961); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION
OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959); Erving Goffman, The Interaction Order, 48 AM Soc.
REv. 1 (1983). I also consulted ERVING GOFFMAN: EXPLORING THE INTERACTION ORDER
(Paul Drew & Anthony Wotton eds., 1988), a collection of scholarly essays in psychology,
linguistics, and sociology interpreting Goffman's scholarship in light of modem social
theory, symbolic interactionism, and ethnomethodology. This Article's reliance on Goffman
is not a full assessment of every aspect of his work.
7. See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 157-
58 (1997) (arguing that a dominant discourse can be expropriated or misappropriated to
expose prevailing forms of discourse and "resignify" them).
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to shift and restructure the larger system of socially-relevant identity
categories to which identity-representing and (re)producing behaviors refer.
Part 11.B links the theme of microperformances to the idea of visibility
as a way of effecting social change for GLBTQ folk.8 Part II.C discusses
Kenji Yoshino's law review article Covering9 and his subsequent book-
length version of COVERING. ' 0 Yoshino considers microperformances of
identity in a sometimes helpful but sometimes problematic way. To the
extent that COVERING (the book) may portray covering as a compelled
stifling of authentic microperformances of identity, its framework is
misleading. It can be read to rely on an underlying authentic, permanent,
unproblematized self. To the extent that it does so, it seems at odds with an
account of identity that understands identity to be dialectical and
dialogical. 1
8. This article will typically use "GLBTQ folk" or "LGBTQ folk" to refer to gay
men, lesbians, bisexuals, transgender folk of various types, and queers. If the context
requires something else, or if GLBTQ is anachronistic, I may vary the usage. English seems
to steer us towards "homosexuality" as the nominalization.
9. 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) [hereinafter Covering (the article)].
10. KENJI YOSfINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006)
[hereinafter COVERING (the book)]. The differentiation is necessary because there are
notable differences between the Covering (the article) and COVERING (the book), many of
which could be summarized as a shift from a focus on equality in the article towards a focus
on liberty and autonomy in the book. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (2007) (suggesting one of the "most striking aspects" of
COVERING (the book) as compared to his Covering (the article) is that his "depiction of
identity and authenticity also calls into question one of his most important motives: his
belief that we should reconfigure civil rights as a matter of liberty rather than equality");
Martha Nussbaum, The Prohibition Era, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 20, 2006, at 21
(reviewing COVERING (the book)); Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1809, 1813 (2007) (comparing Covering (the article) and COVERING (the book) and
arguing that "Yoshino moves the normative justification for the concept of covering away
from equality to individual liberty").
Yoshino also explicitly explains that COVERING (the book) takes on a more
personal, indeed confessional, tone. COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at xii. That is not
the only difference. The book is shorter and its personal narrative is eminently more
accessible to the intelligent lay reader. See Robinson, supra, at 1813 (positing that
Yoshino's inclusion of personal narrative in COVERING (the book) "bring[s] the covering
theory to life in a way that the more legal-historical focus of Covering (the article) does
not"). COVERING (the book) has also lost most of the scholarly apparatus and theoretical
argument. Id. More importantly for purposes of this article, its theory about identity,
visibility, and performance appears to trend in a different direction than the earlier article.
See infra Parts H.C, IV.
11. See infra Part H.C; see also Horwitz, supra note 10, at 1289-91 ("Yoshino puts the
self at the center of his new civil rights paradigm, and specifically the 'true,' authentic self.
But there is no such thing as a project of pure self-elaboration.").
Yoshino also fails to address whether all authentic selves should be equally
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Part I1 applies the idea of microperformances of identity by same-sex
couples to three specific examples of legal and cultural battles around
same-sex marriage and marriage equality. Part 111.A analyzes Shahar v.
Bowers,12 a 1997 en banc decision of the Eleventh Circuit that turns on
interpreting the identity of a same-sex couple, married in a Jewish
Reconstructionist ceremony, living together, and holding themselves out for
all to see as though married. 13 Part llI.B describes an ongoing controversy
in Ocean Grove, New Jersey, where two lesbian couples were denied rental
of a beachfront Pavilion owned by the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting
Association. The Camp Meeting Association, which has a longstanding
formal religious affiliation with Methodism, asserts that the Pavilion is a
building of religious worship, and that the Association cannot be forced by
the public accommodations law of the state of New Jersey to put the
pavilion to a use prohibited by the United Methodist Church, viz., the
celebration of same-sex civil unions.' 4  Part II.C. considers a recent
development following the victory for advocates of marriage equality
before the California Supreme Court. 15 The LGBTQ advocacy groups that
achieved that victory communicated to their collective memberships a Joint
Advisory, entitled Make Change, Not Lawsuits, that exhorts same-sex
couples who might get married in California not to sue to have those
marriages recognized in their home states or by their employers or the
federal government. 16  Instead, Make Change urges same-sex couples
married in California to behave as married couples do, and to have
protected as a matter of law or principle. There is something amiss in a theory that
apparently allows a white racist to claim a right to hurl authentic racist epithets. Robinson,
supra note 10, at 1848 (suggesting that "there is something amiss in the framework
capricious enough to classify the racist's right to use racial epithets alongside the interests of
people of color to work in an environment free from discrimination, at least without more
explanation than Yoshino provides").
12. 114 F.3d 1097 (1lth Cir. 1997) (en banc).
13. See id. at 1107 (implying that the central conflict was created when Shahar made a
"public statement" out of an "intimate relationship").
14. See UNITED METHODIST BOOK OF DISCIPLINE 341.6 (2004 ed.) (declaring that
ceremonies that celebrate homosexual unions shall not be conducted in Methodist churches).
15. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding, in part, that
"privacy and due process provisions of the state Constitution guarantee [the] basic civil right
of marriage to all individuals and couples, without regard to their sexual orientation").
16. American Civil Liberties Union, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders,
Lambda Legal, National Center for Lesbian Rights, Equality Federation, Freedom to Marry,
Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, Human Rights Campaign, National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, Make Change, Not Lawsuits, June 10, 2008, available at
http://www.nchights.org/site/DocServer/Joint__Advisory-_Final.pdfdoclD=3241 [hereinafter
Make Change].
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"conversations" with friends, family, neighbors, employers, and so on about
what being married means to them.1
7
Part IV pursues further the discussion about identity performance and
same-sex marriage. Kenji Yoshino wrote that the contest over same-sex
marriage is about covering. 18 This characterization somewhat misdescribes
the issue. The marriage equality/same-sex marriage controversy is also,
and more centrally, about control of the dramaturgical, dialogical, and
dialectical process of identity practices about sex, gender, and sexual
orientation, as these become focused through contests over the social and
legal recognition of same-sex couples. If you will, the contest over same-
sex marriage is about access to an intangible cultural resource, the status
and identity of marriage, and about the way in which the meaning of that
resource might change as a result of altering access to it.19 Instead of
understanding the issue by relying conceptually on the concept of an
underlying authentic self constrained by covering demands, we might want
to embrace a theoretical approach that seeks to deessentialize, problematize,
and politicize identity performances. Claims of identity, though useful, are
problematic because they always and simultaneously rely on preexisting
identity categories and put them into question. The politics of managing
identity claims are politically necessary but also necessarily incomplete.
Judith Butler celebrates this incompleteness. 20 It is with some irony that I
17. See id. at 5 (suggesting that "[n]othing moves Americans more on LGBT rights
generally and marriage in particular more effectively than conversation that all LGBT people
can have with our friends and family members about how it feels to be treated differently
and why that is so unfair").
18. See, e.g., Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 772-74 (suggesting that same-sex
couples are required to "cover" their relationships in order to maintain or receive social
acceptance).
19. See Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim Within the Same-Sex Marriage
Controversy, 17 COLuM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 343 (2008) (arguing that the same-sex
marriage/marriage equality controversy can be understood as a context over an intangible
cultural resource that has the value of conferring identity on those allowed to participate in
it); see also Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) ("[T]he
institution of marriage carries with it a status and significance that the newly created
classification of civil unions does not embody .. "). The present article develops some
aspects of that earlier Cultural Property article, especially implications of the ideas in the
section of that article concerning everyday microperformances of identity. Poirier, supra, at
383-401.
20. For example, Butler states:
[I]s this infinite postponement of the disclosure of 'gayness' produced by the
very act of 'coming out' to be lamented? Or is this very deferral of the signified
to be valued, a site for the production of values, precisely because the term now
takes on a life that cannot be, can never be, permanently controlled?
MICROPERFORMANCES OF IDENTITY
give Judith Butler the last word here, as she does not believe that there is
one.
L Sex and Gender and Sexual Orientation: How Visible Same-Sex Couples
Disrupt Heteronormative Assumptions
A triad of identity categories is foundational to any discussion of the
same-sex marriage controversy or of the problematic visibility of same-sex
couples. These are sex, gender, and sexual orientation.21 This thumbnail
discussion is by no means exhaustive, and mostly serves to introduce the
idea of the signal importance of visible and otherwise perceptible traits and
gestures-typically, then, gender traits and behaviors as identity markers.
By "sex" we might mean the categorization of the physical body as
male or female. In olden days this would be determined by ascertaining
which set of external sexual organs a baby possessed, though other
characteristics would be assumed to follow-internal sexual organs, and
secondary sexual characteristics at puberty such as facial hair (male) and
breasts (female) and differences in voice timbre and muscle strength. With
the advent of modern genetics we might go on to describe the male/female
binary dimorphism of the body in terms of XY/XX chromosomes, and
endocrinology might contribute oppositions for example between
testosterone and estrogen. We might say sex is about the physical body.
Janet Halley uses the term "sexl .,,22 She recognizes that we often use
the word "sex" in an equally important but somewhat different way in the
same discussions.23 Halley differentiates "sex2," which she defines to mean
Butler, supra note 1, at 16; see infra Part IV.B.
21. See, e.g., Stevi Jackson, Sexuality, Heterosexually and Gender Hierarchy: Getting
Our Priorities Straight, in THINKING STRAIGHT: THE POWER, THE PROMISE, AND THE
PARADOX OF HErEROSEXUALrrY 15, 16 (Chrys Ingraham ed., 2005) (surveying some
influential accounts of gender and sexuality and exploring their implications for the analysis
of heterosexuality and sexual orientation); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender" and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1995) (summarizing this
lengthy article's argument that sex, gender, and sexual orientation are understood in tight
relation to one another and how they are used to maintain a system of male and heterosexual
superiority).
22. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM 24 (2006) ("By sexl, I will mean the purported bodily difference between men
and women.").
23. See id. (suggesting that the use of the word "sex" can carry distinct meanings
within a given conversation).
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that which is concerned with the erotic.24 Halley writes, "[t]he paradigm
image here is 'fucking' .... ,,25 This distinction will reappear later in the
article.
An informed objector might point out a problem with this thumbnail
version of "sexl." Some small percent of the population is born intersexed,
that is, with one of a number of characteristics that do not line up with our
paradigm of the body as an entirely "male" or "female" body.z6 The
"natural" male/female dimorphic binary of sex is not inevitable after all.
Next is gender. "Gender" can be understood in its thumbnail form in
terms of the opposition of masculine and feminine. Gender is about the
way in which the individual appears and behaves-dress, gesture, hairstyle,
makeup, speech, appetites, etc. Much of gender is performed, in habitual,
everyday interactions.21 In our culture, the normal male is masculine and
the normal female feminine. But this correspondence is not dependable:
we know effeminate men and masculine women, not to mention
androgynous men and androgynous women. Also, even though we might
in one way understand masculine and feminine as polar opposites, there are
many gradations and intermediate categories for many gender traits. Nor is
it necessarily appropriate to think of gender as a unidimensional scale with
masculine on one end and feminine on another. Gender expert Sandra
Bem, for example, initially conceived of androgyny as a middle ground for
gender, but eventually moved to a system that categorized individuals as
high/low on masculinity and also as high/low on femininity.28
24. See id. ("By sex2, I mean everything that turns us on .... ); accord Jackson,
supra note 21, at 17 (highlighting that "sex" and "sexual" are used in two senses, to refer to
men/women and to refer to erotic relations and practices).
25. HALLEY, supra note 22, at 24.
26. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, & THE
LAW 209-11 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing that the assumption that there are two sexes each
paired up with XX and XY chromosomes, is wrong); see also Anne Fausto-Sterling, The
Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are Not Enough, THE SCIENCES, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 20-
24 (stating that some people with XX or XY chromosomes do not display male or female
sex characteristics unambiguously and calls such people "intersexuals").
27. See Jackson, supra note 21, at 16 (arguing that gender is both a structural
phenomenon and is "lived out by embodied individuals who 'do gender' in their daily lives,
constantly (re)producing it through habitual, everyday interaction").
28. See SANDRA BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE OF
SEXUAL INEQUALITY 124-27 (1993); see also Edward Stein, Conclusion: The Essentials of
Constructionism and the Construction of Essentialism, in FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 325, 336-37 (Edward Stein
ed., 1990) (discussing problems with viewing masculinity and femininity as opposite poles
of a unidimensional scale).
MICROPERFORMANCES OF IDENTITY
We often use the perceptible signs and indicia of gender to draw
conclusions about an individual's sex. Sandra Bern tells the story of her
own five-year old son, who insisted on going to school one day wearing
barrettes. He was teased mercilessly about being a girl. In an effort to
defend himself, he pulled down his pants and pointed at his penis: "I'm a
boy," he exclaimed. His tormentor replied, "Oh, everybody's got one of
those. Only girls wear barrettes.,
29
This wonderful anecdote has several points. It illustrates what we
have come to understand, that children from a very early age sort the people
around them, and the social categories around them, by gender.30 It also
suggests that the gender binary, and the behaviors that signal and maintain
it, could be more important in daily interactions than the underlying
dimorphic body itself.
3'
Intersexed individuals do not fit the paradigm of male/female, and yet
we typically want to assign them a male or female sex, as well as to address
them and interpret them in terms of masculine/feminine. Indeed, with the
advent of modem science, surgery and/or hormone treatments may be used
to correct a body that does not conform to the male/female binary, thus
reasserting the importance both of a visible masculine/feminine binary and
of the importance of understanding it to be the reflection of an underlying
dimorphism of male/female bodies. 32  Ironically, we correct nature by
medical means in order to maintain the sense of a natural male/female
dimorphism.
Transsexuals, whose subjectively experienced gender identity does not
match the identity assigned to their physical body, represent another gap in
the standard alignment of sexl and gender. Transsexuals may turn to
changes in gender behavior or to alteration of the sexed body through
hormonal treatments or surgery to bring their sex l and gender in line with
29. BEM, supra note 28, at 149.
30. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 21, at 32 ("Gender difference is one of the first
categories a child learns.").
31. See id. at 17 (asserting that it is gender that enables us to see biological sex); see
also Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (arguing that "in every
way that matters, sex bears an epiphenomenal relationship to gender; that is, under close
examination, almost every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex discrimination can be
shown to be grounded in normative gender roles and rules").
32. As Nancy Knauer writes, understanding the intersexed to "experience
incongruence between physical gender and the gender assigned at birth ... privileges the
physical as the true situs of gender. " Nancy J. Knauer, Gender Matters: Making the Case
for TransInclusion, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 1, 25 (2007).
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their subjective gender identity. Visible transgendered and other
transsexual individuals trouble what often is deep-seated unquestioning
reliance on male/female dimorphism and gender polarization.33
"Sexual orientation" is a third identity category. It might be expressed
in a heterosexual/homosexual binary. Ed Stein recommends an important
refinement, conceiving of heterosexual and homosexual as two poles, with
many individuals lying somewhere in-between on this one-dimensional
scale.34 If the binaries or poles are presumed to be distinct, sexual
orientation could be described as addressing the question of with which sex
a particular person wants to have sex. Using Halley's terms, our society
until recently assumed that a person of one sexl would "naturally" desire to
have sex2 with a person of the other sex .35 Same-sex sexual attraction was
viewed as deviant, whether described as unnatural, sin or propensity to sin,
or as illness. We can call this outlook heteronormativity. "Heterosexuality
is the key site of intersection between gender and sexuality .... ,36  if
bodies are not easily and naturally categorized as men and women (sexl),
then we will have trouble applying a binary of heterosexual/homosexual.37
33. As Elvia Arriola writes, in the context of a controversy caused by a male-to-female
(MTF) transsexual attending a predominantly lesbian support group:
An ingrained belief that all human beings exist only within the framework of
sexual dimorphism or gender polarization manifests itself in the social
conviction that no one can (or should) ever depart from the roles and cues which
accompany each sex/gender. An exclusionist reaction to the MTF transsexual
obviously illustrated the pervasiveness of this gender-bipolar belief system. For
no matter how an individual might change her/his gender identity, whether
through behavior and attire, or through hormones and surgery, or even the
consciousness-raising of a women's support group, the transition is viewed as
untrustworthy and unacceptable.
Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Gendered Politics of Identity: Who Owns the Label
"Lesbian"?, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 18 (1997). At the same time, as Knauer argues,
transgendered insistence on the lived experience of gender troubles the progressive stance
that gender is performed and socially constructed and therefore does not matter. Knauer,
supra note 32, at 3, 6. Thus, transgendered individuals may be unwelcome both because
they question traditional sex and gender binaries and because they rely on them.
34. Stein, supra note 28, at 334-35.
35. Jackson, supra note 21, at 17, 29.
36. Id. at 17.
37. Some societies also seek to create a category that recognizes and accommodates
sexual orientation minorities through a "third gender" language. See, e.g., Tilak Pokharel, In
Conservative Nepal, a Tribune for the 'Third Gender' Speaks Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2008, at A6 (describing approach to homosexuality in Nepal and, to some extent, South
Africa). This article will not further explore third-sex and third-gender categorizations,
either as an anthropological account of certain non-Western societies or as an alternative
approach to describing the identity implications of same-sex couples. It is not an approach
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Another issue also disrupts the binary of heterosexual/homosexual:
bisexuality. Some folks experience sexual desire for both men and
women-for them the question of sexl is not a necessary prerequisite to a
38desire for sex2. Accounts also often leave out the possibility that some
people are asexual, not interested in sex.
A traditionalist understanding of marriage relies on all these binary
categories. Traditional marriage is between a man and a woman, their sexl
presumably ascertained in part by gender and reinforcing our ideas of
gender. The couple experience desire for one another (heterosexual sexual
orientation), that is, they wish to have socially-approved sex2 with one
another, presumably in theory in a monogamous and life-long committed
relationship. Opposite sex couples will produce or will have the potential
to produce children; indeed heterosexual sex is understood as normatively
procreative 39 Those children will already be of one sex or the other, but
they must acquire appropriate gender behavior and, to the extent that gender
is learned and that sexual orientation is learned or a choice, must also learn
gender and sexual orientation, in order to eventually properly undertake
widely adopted in the United States or in Western culture generally.
38. Kenji Yoshino has asked a most interesting question-why bisexual sexual
orientation is so often elided or omitted. Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual
Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000). He offers a sophisticated and multipart answer,
which cannot be fully summarized here. In part, he posits that a category of bisexual
threatens the sense of stability of identity of both heterosexual and homosexual individuals.
Id. at 388-89. If there are more than two categories, then we don't have a single clear
"Other." Id. at 400-02. Yoshino also argues that establishing what sexual orientation one
has/is is made problematic if we acknowledge bisexuality. Id. at 401. Someone of one sexl
who desires and/or has sex2 with someone of the opposite sex1 has only gone part of the
way towards establishing by performance that s/he is heterosexual. Id. S/he must also
establish that s/he has not and will not at some other time desire/have sex2 with someone of
the same sexl. This involves proving a negative-which is tough to do. Id. at 401. A
similar anxiety about inability to establish sexual identity performatively arises from those
on the homosexual side of the hetero-homo binary. Id. at 404-06.
39. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, The Conservative's Dilemma: Traditional Institutions,
Social Change, and Same-Sex Marriage, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1059, 1077 (2005) ("An
essentialist argument repeatedly advanced by opponents of same-sex marriage is that
marriage's chief rationale is the production and nurturing of children.").
To be sure, any particular opposite sex couple may be infertile. And any
individual or couple may bring children into the relationship in a way other than procreation
between them. Nevertheless, the iconic heterosexual couple at the center of much
traditionalist argument is procreative inter se. They are normatively expected to have sex of
the reproductive kind. See, e.g., John Finnis, Law, Morality & "Sexual Orientation," in
SAME SEX: DEBATING THE ETHIcs, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE OF HOMOSEXUALITY 31, 34 (John
Corvino ed., 1997). For a response to Finnis on the issue of sterile heterosexual couples see
for example Andrew Koppelman, Homosexual Conduct: A Reply to the New Natural
Lawyers, in SAME SEX 44, supra, at 46-50.
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sex2. The opposite-sex parents provide gender role models and, to the
extent sexual orientation is understood to be learned, sexual orientation role
models. Traditional marriage is thus laced with the normal versions of all
three identity categories.4°
Visible same-sex couples disrupt this comfortable, self-reproducing,
heteronormative binary system.41 For starters, visible same-sex couples
suggest that the couple is having homosexual sex or wants to have
homosexual sex, which is troubling to many people all on its own.42 The
visible same-sex couple also calls into question the naturalness and
inevitability of the sexl binary, the corresponding gender polarization, and
the way in which normal (heterosexual) sex2 and sexual desire occur within
those other binaries. Thus, Mark Fajer famously asked whether two real
men could eat quiche together.43 The mere visible evidence of their close
friendship would threaten the background assumption that men are
heterosexual, and could deter them.44 Public behavior as an intimate same-
sex couple stands in as a signal for homosexuality even when the pair are
not homosexual, and it risks adverse consequences, sometimes extreme
40. For accounts of various aspects of this traditionalist view, see for example:
Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the Eminent Rationality of
Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response to Professor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 147 (1997); William C. Duncan, Marriage and the Utopian Temptation, 59
RUTGERS L. REV. 265, 266-70 (2007); Amy L. Wax, Traditionalism, Pluralism, and Same-
Sex Marriage, 59 RUTGERS L. REv. 577,580-89 (2007).
41. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis.
L. REv. 187, 196, 218-21, 232 (1998) (arguing that societal disapprobation of homosexuality
is not just about sexual activities, but more importantly about the disruption of gender roles
and with them disruption of the traditional family structure).
42. See Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 24 ("[A]nti-gay feeling is not just about
difference, it is centrally about sex."). See generally Richard E. Redding, It's Really About
Sex: Same-Sex Marriage, Lesbigay Parenting, and the Psychology of Disgust, 15 DuKE J.
GENDER L. & POL. 127 (2008).
43. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together: Storytelling, Gender
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511
(1992).
44. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,
267 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'd on reh' g, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (providing the example of
public displays of affection as one way of establishing gay or lesbian identity); David Cole
& William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of
Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319, 320 (1994) (discussing
hand holding, kissing, and other couple behavior as evidence of homosexuality in light of the
military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy); Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 843, 847-48
(identifying as among the types of choices whether to cover or flaunt homosexuality matters
of private displays of same-sex affection versus public displays of affection, and single or
secretly coupled vs. openly coupled).
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consequences.45 In a recent and gruesome example, an Ecuadorian man,
Jos6 Sucuzhafiay, was beaten and subsequently died after he was attacked
while walking home from a bar with his brother, their arms around each
otherY6 The attackers shouted anti-gay and anti-Latino epithets.47 The




LGBTQ advocates are well aware of the particularly problematic
nature of the same-sex couple. Mary Anne Case pointed out that at one
point not so long ago, LGBTQ advocates shied away from litigating same-
sex couples issues because these couples raised most starkly the
transgressive potential of homosexuality, not just as couples but because
they might be thought to couple-that is, to have sex.49 Case explains that
visible same-sex couples are problematic because such coupling is
"indicative of a homosexual orientation both more firmly established and
more public than either an occasional furtive, anonymous encounter or an
admission of orientation unaccompanied by demonstrable homosexual
acts.,50  Both same sex pair bonding and copulating are "sufficient
marker[s] for the evil that is homosexuality .... ,,
45. See Gill Valentine, (Re)Negotiating the "Heterosexual Street": Lesbian
Productions of Space, in BODYSPACE: DESTABILIZING GEOGRAPHIES OF GENDER AND
SEXUALITY 146 (Nancy Duncan ed., 1996) (discussing an incident in which a lesbian couple
was thrown out of a store in Nottingham, England, for kissing); John Corvino, Kiss and Tell,
THE ADVOCATE, Feb. 1, 2005, at 1 (the author was threatened with arrest by state troopers
for "homosexual conduct"-kissing another man in public-on the grounds of the state
capitol); Jennifer B. Lee, What Do You Call Two Straight Men Having Dinner?, N.Y TIMES,
Apr. 10, 2005, at 1 (discussing how two men dining together outside the context of sports or
business will lead to questions about their sexual orientation).
46. Editorial, A Lynching in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at A38; Kareem
Fahim, Family Keeps Vigil for Beaten Brooklyn Man, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at A35;
Robert McFadden, Attack on Ecuadorean Brothers Investigated as Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2008, at A29.
47. Editorial, supra note 46; Fahim, supra note 46; McFadden, supra note 46.
48. Editorial, supra note 46.
49. See Mary Anne Case, Couples and Couplings in the Public Sphere: A Comment
on the Legal History of Litigating for Gay and Lesbian Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1659
(1993) ("[The couple may present a double bind for gay and lesbian litigants because it
focuses courts on what couples do, that is to say, have sex.").
As far as the predominance of a strategy of avoiding litigation based on same-sex
couples, things have changed: "[Tihe rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay rights movement
has become 'the couple'-a We." Franke, supra note 5, at 239; cf Holning Lau,
Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1296-97 (2006) (arguing for a separate conceptual protection for same-
sex couples qua couples in sexual orientation antidiscrimination law).
50. Case, supra note 49, at 1658.
51. Id. at 1661.
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Fajer, Case, and others discuss the visibility of same-sex couples as a
separate matter from the legal recognition of same-sex couples.52 The two
are interrelated. Visibility increases the likelihood of legal recognition;
legal recognition increases the likelihood of visibility. Visibility and legal
recognition reinforce each other as indicia of a non-stigmatized (normal)
status for same-sex couples, that is, social recognition. Same-sex couples'
visibility to others encourages others to be similarly visible.53 And more
generally, visibility of GLBT folk creates a feedback loop around this
stigmatized identity trait, which will tend to make it more visible and less
stigmatized.54 Choices that favor invisibility will create a contrary and
opposite feedback loop, one that tends to perpetuate invisibility and
stigma.5
I. Microperformances of Identity: Dramaturgical, Dialogical, and
Dialectical
The preceding Part describes sex, gender, and sexual orientation
identity categories, and raises the question of the relationship of visible
appearance and of (presumably) stable underlying identity. This Part
provides a more extended discussion of deliberate interaction and identity
performance. It relies on some of the work of Erving Goffman56 to
introduce a number of ideas that are still quite important to contemporary
LGBT issues, including the issue of same-sex marriage. Subsequent
sections of the article apply ideas introduced here. After the discussion of
Goffman, this Part discusses briefly the implications of microperformances
of visible LGBT couples and then critiques some aspects of Kenji
52. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REv. 873, 894-904
(2006) (discussing choices by members of same-sex couples about what to reveal about their
relationships, as it would affect their identity as perceived by in-groups and out-groups).
53. I'd say "in public" but "public" is a highly problematic term on its own.
54. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The Supreme Court, Visibility, and the "Politics of
Presence", 50 VAND. L. REv. 411, 413-15 (1997) (describing an interrelationship of literal
visibility, political visibility, and programmatic visibility as a way of describing the
mechanism of advancing the interests of stigmatized groups).
55. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy's Domain, 50 VAND.
L. REv. 361, 403 (1997) (describing how coerced gay invisibility limits both the ability to
participate in lawmaking processes and the extent of more diffuse social knowledge about
gays).
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (identifying the portions of Goffman's
scholarship reviewed).
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Yoshino's concept of covering as presented in Covering (the article) and
COVERING (the book).
A. Erving Goffman on Performances of the Self and the Dynamics of
Microinteractions
Erving Goffman was an important if idiosyncratic sociologist.57 His
work continues to be influential a generation after his death in 1983.
Throughout his career, Goffman focused on various aspects of the ways in
which the presentation of the self occurred in microinteractions.5 s Goffman
conceived of his overall topic of investigation as the small interactions
between an individual and his audience, performances of self for an
audience, or what he called dramaturgy.
The perspective employed in this report is that of the theatrical
performance; the principles derived are dramaturgical ones. I shall
consider the way in which the individual in ordinary work situations
presents himself and his activity to others, the ways in which he guides
and controls the impression they form of him, and the kinds of thinks he
may and may not do while sustaining his performance before them.
An individual will seek to control the behavior of others through the
messages conveyed by his own behavior, verbal and non-verbal, which
communicates who he or she is for purposes of a particular situation.6° As
Goffman conceives it, there are both verbal and nonverbal aspects of
performances of self.61 He is primarily concerned with "the more theatrical
and contextual kind, the non-verbal, presumably unintentional kind,
whether this communication be purposely engineered or not."62 Non-verbal
57. See generally, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN: EXPLORING THE INTERACTION ORDER, supra
note 6.
58. See generally, e.g., Erving Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6; ERVING
GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 6; ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note 6. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN: EXPLORING THE
INTERACTION ORDER, supra note 6.
59. GOFFMAN, PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 6, at xi. Goffman continues the
stagecraft metaphor for the presentation of self. Id. at 15-16.
60. Id. at 3-4. This behavior may involve deceit or feigning, that is, deliberate verbal
and nonverbal misinformation. Id. at 2. The range of possibilities for interaction, however,
is much broader than a simple T/F account of the individual.
61. Id. at 2 (distinguishing between the information that the individual gives verbally
and a wide variety of actions that are nonverbal and that others "can treat as symptomatic of
the actor").
62. Id. at4.
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presentation is likely to be less securely in an individual's control, and
consequently the others present are likely to rely on it for information about
the individual.63 Goffman also observes that not all aspects of an
individual's presentation are conscious: "Sometimes the traditions of an
individual's role will lead him to give a well-designed impression of a
particular kind and yet he may be neither consciously nor unconsciously
disposed to create such an impression."64 I would say that what Goffman
describes here are aspects of identity performance that have become
naturalized, so that they no longer are behaviors about which the individual
makes conscious choices. 65 They are simply re-enacted without conscious
effort.
Goffman points out that his dramaturgical model is inexact in an
important way. On stage, one actor presents himself, in interaction with
other actors, for the benefit of third party observers, the audience; "[iun real
life, the three parties are compressed into two; the part one individual plays
is tailored to the parts played by the others present, and yet these others also
constitute the audience.', 66 They are not just an audience; they are co-
participants.67 So the process of the presentation of self is interactive. A
more accurate description would state that each person who is present in an
encounter is involved in the interaction of all participants' mutually
constituting selves. Goffman writes:
[W]hen we allow that the individual projects a definition of the situation
when he appears before others, we must also see that the others,
however passive their role may seem to be, will themselves effectively
project a definition of the situation by virtue of their response to the
individual and by virtue of any lines of action they initiate to him.
68
Effectively, each participant is an actor engaged in an ongoing
micronegotiation, which is simultaneously about each of them and all of
them in the particular situation. In other words,
We have then a kind of interactional modus vivendi. Together the
participants contribute to a single over-all definition of the situation
63. Id. at 7-8 (emphasizing that examples frequently include unintended gestures).
64. Id. at 6.
65. Cf Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2029 (1995) (arguing that expectations around
workplace behavior are culturally conditioned to express and reproduce white norms in a
way that whites are unaware of, that is, transparent to them).
66. GOFFMAN, PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 6, at xi.
67. Id. at 15-16.
68. Id. at9.
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which involves not so much a real agreement as to what exists but rather
a real agreement as to whose claims concerning what issues will be
temporarily honored.
69
Moreover, "[a]s the interaction among the participant's progresses,
additions and modifications in this initial information state will of course
occur .... " 70 In short, performances of the self in everyday life are not
only dramaturgical, they are also what I will call dialogical.
Social psychologists Michael Schwalbe and Douglas Mason-Schrock
neatly summarize these aspects of the dramaturgical perspective on
identity:
In this view, social life is made up of connected dramatic enactments
through which people communicate their dispositions and coordinate
action .... It is in and through these dramatizations that selves are
signified and affirmed, both to others and reflexively to one's self. The
goal of dramaturgical analysis is, then, to describe and explain how
people construct their performances and thereby create themselves and
each other as social objects.
71
The negotiation of the meaning of microinteractions is not and cannot
be solely about verbal and nonverbal behaviors in specific microcontexts.
The behaviors we use to manifest aspects of our identities have meaning,
and function as signs; they are interpreted through shared systems of
signification that we reference when we seek to interpret
microperformances. As Goffman points out in The Interaction Order, an
important professional address at the end of his career summarizing his
work,72 "[e]very culture... seems to have a vast lore of fact and fantasy
regarding embodied indicators of status and character, thus appearing to
render persons readable. 7 3 Microinteractions in social situations rely on
this lore-which I shall refer to as a lexicon (my term, not Goffman' s)-to
interpret situations and the individual gestures within those situations.
There is an "available repertoire" of "culturally standard" displays. 74 "By a
69. Id. at 9-10.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Michael L. Schwalbe & Douglas Mason-Schrock, Identity Work as Group
Process, 13 ADvANCES IN GROUP PRocEssEs 113, 114 (1996) (citation omitted). Schwalbe
and Mason-Schrock rely explicitly and extensively on Goffman. Id. at 114, 116.
72. Erving Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6. This was Goffman's
inaugural address as president of the American Sociological Association in 1982. Id.
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id. at 11. See also Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, supra note 71, at 115 (explaining
the contours of identity). Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock state:
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sort of prearrangement... social situations seem to be perfectly designed to
provide us with evidence of a participant's various attributes .... ,,7 We
rely on this shared and general lexicon to understand the specific situation.
Fluency in a particular culture's lexicon of signs for social relationships and
identity traits is thus essential for the participants in microinteractions.76
And as Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock point out, while one kind of "identity
work" involves individual uses of signs, rules, and conventions to create
images of themselves in interactions, another kind "is necessarily
communal: the creation of identities as widely understood signs with a set
of rules and conventions for their use. 7
The relationship of a particular behavior to its meaning as an indicator
of some aspect of the self is not fixed. We are here in the domain of the
signifier, as sketched out by Saussure.78  The signifier is, to a very
considerable extent, arbitrary in its relationship to any particular
significance or meaning. Goffman recognizes this characteristic
arbitrariness of gestural behaviors as signifiers, albeit not in Saussure's
terms. For one thing, he acknowledges that we must rely on social and
historical context to appreciate the meanings of particular behaviors in
microinteractions. 9 Moreover, in his discussion on how to approach small,
perfunctory "contact rituals, '80 he writes:
Identities ... are indexes of the self. By this we mean that identities are signs
that refer to qualities of the identity claimant. An identity.., is not a meaning
but a sign that evokes meaning, in the form of a response aroused in the person
who interprets it.
Id.
75. Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6, at 8.
76. Goffman further explores the centrality of the information each participant in an
interaction has about the world and about the information held by the other participants:
At the very center of interaction life is the cognitive relation we have with those
present before us, without which relationship our activity, behavioral and verbal,
could not be meaningfully organized. And although this cognitive relationship
can be modified during a social contact, and typically is, the relationship itself is
extrasituational, consisting of the information a pair of persons have about the
information each other has of the world, and the information they have (or
haven't) concerning the possession of this information.
Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6, at 4-5.
77. Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, supra note 71, at 115.
78. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 1907-11 (Charles
Bally et al. eds., Wade Baskin trans., Peter Owen Ltd. 1959).
79. See Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6, at 9. ("All elements of social
life have a history and are subject to critical change through time, and none can be fully
understood apart from the particular culture in which it occurs.").
80. For example, Goffman explains that "priority in being served, precedence through
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At best they are likely to have only loosely coupled relations to anything
by way of social structures that might be associated with them. They are
sign vehicles fabricated from depictive materials at hand, and what they
come to be taken as "reflection" of is necessarily an open question.
81
This arbitrariness has an extraordinarily important consequence for
social relations over time. Ordinarily, to be sure, the repeated interpretation
of microperformances will reproduce the pre-existing social order,
reinforcing the shared lexicon of identity traits. Goffman writes that
normally in applying the "vast lore or fact and fantasy regarding embodied
indicators of status and character," we "vividly re-present what we already
know. '82 But not necessarily 3 -"[o]ne can point... to obvious ways in
which social structures are dependent on, and vulnerable to, what occurs in
face-to-face contacts."84 Various social attributes may not be congruent
with one another, or may not mesh with salient personal attributes.85 The
evidence provided in face-to-face interactions may be "complex '86 and it
may not all point in the same direction.
Consider (my example, not Goffman's) the argument often made by a
same-sex partner in pursuit of a de facto parent or psychological parent
doctrine and holding, that she or he should be treated as a parent for
purposes of custody of a child s/he had helped to raise, in the face of a
presumption that a non-biological same-sex partner was not a fit parent.
87
Or consider the point Carlos Ball makes when he describes how marriage
a door, centrality of seating, access to various public places, preferential interruption rights
in talk, selection as addressed recipient .... " Id. at 11.
81. Id. Goffinan explains later in the essay that small interactive gestures are "loosely
coupled" in another sense-they may be understood to refer to relationships among different
social categories (e.g. young/old, male/female, status). Id. at 12. Goffman similarly notes in
his consideration of stigma that attributes stigmatizing in one context may not be so in
another. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 6, at 3-4.
82. See Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6, at 8 (referring generally to
Pierre Bourdieu on the concept of reproducing social structure, but providing no specific
citations to Bourdieu's work).
83. See id. ("But that conservative impact is not, analytically speaking, situational.").
84. Id.
85. See id. ("Covert value given, say, to race, can be mitigated by covert value given
to other structural variables-class, gender, age, comemberships, sponsorship networks-
structures which at best are not fully congruent with each other.").
86. Id.
87. See Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage
Equality in New Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris a Dead End or Just a Detour?, 59 RUTGERS L.
REv. 291, 313-18 (2007) (describing access to the psychological parent doctrine in terms of
performance of an idealized parental identity).
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equality litigation "has contributed to the gap between the perception of
lesbians and gay men as individuals defined exclusively through their
sexual conduct and the observable reality of lesbians and gay men as full
human beings who, among other traits, care for and love others." 88 Or
consider a historical example-the speculation that Supreme Court Justice
Lewis Powell might have voted differently in Bowers v. Hardwick09 if his
clerk at the time, who was closeted, had come out to him personally instead
of making an abstract argument on behalf of gays. 9° In short, although the
interpretation of microinteractions "ordinarily allows for the surreptitious
consolidation of structural lines, the same arrangement can also serve to
loosen them."91  Let us call this the "complexifying potential" of
microinteractions.
We can thus appreciate that Goffman himself eventually discerned in
his dramaturgical approach to identity-(re)producing interactions an
additional dimension. Not only are they dramaturgical and dialogical, they
are also dialectical. That is, the very lexicon upon which all the participants
depend can be shifted through microinteractions that present evidence that
calls into question the established meanings of the behaviors being
interpreted. Moreover, this kind of pressure for reform through the
microinteractions can be brought to bear expressly by political groups as
well as individuals. 92 It may or may not actually succeed in effecting
broader social change. Sometimes, though, a focus on forms of address and
politeness and "systematic breaching of standards for seemly public dress"
can be effective politically.93 I cannot resist quoting Goffman's assessment
of the early Quakers.
That sturdy band of plain speakers should always stand before us as an
example of the wonderfully disruptive power of systematic
impoliteness, reminding us once again of the vulnerabilities of the
88. Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from
Brown v. Board and its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1493, 1534 (2006).
89. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
90. See, e.g., COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 62-65 (stating that instead of
coming out, when asked his opinion, the clerk stated that the right to chose whom to love
was more important than the right to vote).
91. Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6, at 8.
92. See id. at 12 (discussing political interventions in social interactions, from above
and below).
93. Id. at 13.
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interaction order. There is no doubt: Fox's disciples raised to
monumental heights the art of becoming a pain in the ass.
Again Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock summarize succinctly: "to
understand identity-making it is necessary to examine not only individual
self-presentations but the joint creation of the symbolic resources upon
which those presentations depend-an activity we refer to as subcultural
identity work., 95 Moreover,
while certain kinds of episodes can be routinized, they are never entirely
unproblematic. Even when familiar identities are claimed or imposed,
there is always room for negotiation .... And there is always room for
things to go wrong. Discrepant signs can appear and undermine an
initial identity claim. Efforts to manage these contingencies.., are part
of the identity work inescapably demanded by social life.
96
As they summarize, "Because of the possibility of contention, identity
codes may never be settled once and for all; they may be negotiated
continually as people try to stretch and modify them and as outsiders try to
co-opt them. ,,97
Sociologist Joseph Gusfield offers some helpful observations on how
this kind of face-to-face departure from expected microperformances of
identity is related to larger social movements. Gusfield argues that "social
movement studies have shown an undue emphasis on the political and have
understated the importance of movements that create changes in everyday
living outside the institutional structure of modem life. 9 8  While we
typically think of social movements as "seeking, in a more or less deliberate
fashion, to produce change in the political or institutional character of
society, "99 movements also usually develop a "cultural meaning" that
promises to change our interpretations of everyday life. 1°°  Using
homosexual [sic] visibility as an example, Gusfield writes:
94. Id.
95. Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, supra note 71, at 115.
96. Id. at 116 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 116,125.
98. Joseph R. Gusfield: The Reflexivity of Social Movements: Collective Behavior and
Mass Society Revisited, in NEw SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO IDENTrTY 58, 75
(Enrique Larafia, Hank Johnston, & Joseph R. Gusfield eds., 1994). Elsewhere in this essay
Gusfield writes, "[A] a focus on organizational and associational elements are [sic]
insufficient tools for understanding diffuse and often apolitical new social movements." Id.
at 61.
99. Id. at 70.
100. See id. at 64 (arguing that social movements typically involve both formal
associational structures with specific goals and a more diffuse challenge to cultural
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If we imagine the interaction between homosexual and heterosexual
persons prior to the emergence of the gay rights movement, we posit a
conventionalized set of norms to which people adhere or behave in
idiosyncratic, individualistic forms. Once the movement is set in
motion, behavior can no longer be conventionalized. Behaviors are
undertaken with a recognition that alternatives are both possible and
socially legitimated at some level. Homosexuals attempt to change
discriminatory laws but also become more open about their identity.
Interaction between homosexuals and heterosexuals takes on a new
tone .... What is happening is that the conventional norms of deviance
that have guided both homosexuals and heterosexuals have come to be
doubted and their acceptance made problematic. What was 'taken for
granted' has become an issue.
101
Thus, once what Gusfield calls the "gay liberation movement" gets
underway, in addition to its "organizational manifestos" the movement
"also exists in daily judgments that pose new issues for homosexuals and
heterosexual as to how they are to identify themselves and others. Self-
conscious and deliberate choice is being made against a background of
awareness of the movements. ,,102 In short, a social movement "represents
social relations and culture in possible transition."' 1 3 Notably, Gusfield
uses the word introduced by Goffman to describe performances of the self,
asserting that modem social movements have a "dramaturgical
character". 104  In another essay on new social movements generally,
Gusfield and his co-authors similarly observe that "in and through
movements that have no clear class or structural base, the movement
becomes the focus for the individual's definition of himself or herself, and
meanings, including everyday interactions and understandings of identity). The everyday
and interactive aspects of social movements are more fluid and may not even have an
organizational base. See id. at 65 (discussing the hippie movement as an example of fluidity
and lack of structure in a social movement that was nevertheless recognizable and
important); id. at 62 (regarding the women's movement, "Being a member or nonmember is
not constituted by a specific act but refers to types of ideational commitment. The action of
the movement has its locus in a multiplicity of events, often that of individuals.")
101. Id. at 66.
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 74. In exploring the idea that social movements often affect individuals'
understanding of events, Gusfield also relies inter alia on Goffman's concept of frame
analysis. Id at 69 (discussing ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE (1974)). As Gusfield explains it "The concept of framing is a
recognition that the meaning of events may make for differing experiences of the 'same'
data. What is centrally attended to by one kind of interest or audience may not be attended
to al all by another." Id.
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action within the movement is a complex mix of the collective and
individual confirmations of identity." 10 5  Thus, "many contemporary
movements are 'acted out' in individual actions rather than through or
among mobilized groups."' 1 6
In the concluding section of The Interaction Order, Goffman turns to a
related and pressing matter: interaction processes that concern four critical,
widely-shared identity statuses. These statuses are age-grade, gender, class,
and race. 0 7  These attributes share two critical features. First, every
individual can be located easily on a cross-cutting grid of these statuses "by
virtue of the markers our bodies bring with them into all our social
situations, no prior information about us being required."'10 8 To be sure, we
are also socialized "in subtle ways, [to insure] that our placement in these
regards will be more evident than might otherwise be."'1 9 So perceptibility
of traits is an important part of the way these diffuse identity statuses
function in microinteractions.1°
Second, these markers are typically used to generate and reproduce
status hierarchies. Goffman reflects on the management of undesirable
identity traits in his book Stigma.' By "stigma" he means
visible/perceptible attributes of an individual that communicate taint or
discredit the individual to strangers." 2 These kinds of attributes or traits are
not inevitably related to the stigmatized identities that they are understood
to communicate: "A stigma ... is really a special kind of relationship
between attribute and stereotype."11 3 We again are in the realm of the
arbitrary signifier, relying on specific context and a communally-shared
105. Hank Johnston, Enrique Larafia, & Joseph R. Gusfield, Identities, Grievances, and
New Social Movements, in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY 3, 8
(Enrique Larafia, Hank Johnston, & Joseph R. Gusfield eds., 1994). Examples of this type
of movement include the hippies and the gay rights and women's movements. Id. at 7.
106. Id. at7.
107. Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6, at 14.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. ("[A]ny trait that is not easily perceptible could hardly acquire the capacity
of a diffuse status-determining (or more correctly, status-identifying) trait, at least in modem
society."); see also GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 6, at 48 (emphasizing that while identity
traits are typically visible, they may also be perceived by other senses (e.g., language) so that
the broader category of "perceptible" traits is the more accurate).
11. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 6.
112. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at4.
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lexicon that establishes dominant and subordinate statuses to (re)produce
stigma in specific microinteractions.
Because presentations of self are dramaturgical and dialogical,
individuals can and will seek to manage the presentations of their
stigmatizing traits, deploying various "techniques of information
management."' 1 4 Goffman observes that "stigma management is a general
feature of society, a process occurring wherever there are identity
norms." 115 Where an individual who is stigmatized seeks to be understood
as "normal", 1 6 that individual may seek to pass or to cover. Both passing
and covering are "application[s] of the arts of impression management, the
arts, basic in social life, through which the individual exerts strategic
control over the image of himself and his products that others glean from
him."'17
Goffman devotes a considerable effort to describing the dynamics of
passing strategies.1 18  From the perspective of accurate description,
Goffman points out, it is important to distinguish between situations where
"differentness is known about already or is evident on the spot" and
situations where it is "neither known about by those present nor
immediately perceivable by them."' 19 In the first type of situation Goffman
calls the individual "discredited," in the second "discreditable."'120 An
114. Id. at91-92.
115. Id. at 130.
116. See id. at 5 (using "normal" to define people who do not depart negatively from
the particular expectations at issue). Elsewhere in the book Goffman stresses that
"stigmatized" and "normal" are not so much two separate groups of individuals as "a
pervasive two-role social process, in which every individual participates in both roles, at
least in some connections and in some phases of life." Id. at 138. "Normal" and
"stigmatized" "are not persons but rather perspectives." Id. "[T]he role of normal and the
role of stigmatized are parts of the same complex, cuts from the same standard cloth." Id. at
130.
117. Id. at 130.
118. Id.at73-91.
119. Id. at 4. Elsewhere in Stigma, Goffman explores the idea of "known-about-ness."
Id. at 49. In contrast to visibility or perceptibility, known-about-ness refers to previous
knowledge, which may come from previous contacts or gossip or (though Goffman does not
mention this specifically here) declarations by the individual himself. Id. at 49. One might
say that "known-about-ness" has a temporally extensive dimension different from the
immediate signification processes of visible/perceptible traits that are in play when
individuals are co-present in microinteractions of identity. To be sure, immediately
visible/perceptible traits are only interpretable because of a lexicon acquired over time, so
they too have a temporal dimension, but of a different kind.
120. Id. at 4.
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individual who is "discredited"-that is, whose stigmatizing trait is either
already known or immediately apparent----cannot pass.
Goffman also introduces another important concept: "covering."
2 1
[P]ersons who are ready to admit possession of a stigma (in many cases
because it is known about or immediately apparent) may nonetheless
make a great effort to keep the stigma from looming large. The
individual's object is to reduce tension, that is, to make it easier for
himself and the others to withdraw covert attention from the stigma, and
to sustain spontaneous involvement in the official content of the
interaction.
This concept has been subsequently developed in the legal academic
literature with regard to race, sex/gender, and sexual orientation. 123 Some
aspects of Kenji Yoshino's important contribution, entitled Covering (the
article) and COVERING (the book), are discussed in Part I.C. infra.
Inasmuch as covering involves the manipulation of perceptible traits, it
often uses the same signifiers as passing, and "what will conceal a stigma
from unknowing persons may also ease matters for those in the know."' 24
The difference between the two is sometimes, perhaps often, not about the
stigmatized performer at all but about the audience and what it already
knows about the performer.
The whole system of performances around various normal/stigmatized
characteristics can serve to shore up and reproduce status divisions. This
includes passing and covering, which, Goffman argues, involve
a form of tacit cooperation between normals and the stigmatized: the
deviator can afford to remain attached to the norm because others are
careful to respect his secret, pass lightly over its disclosure, or disattend
evidence which prevents a secret from being made of it; these others, in
turn, can afford to extend this tactfulness because the stigmatized will
voluntarily refrain from pushing 5claims for acceptance much past the
point normals find comfortable.
121. Id. at 102-04.
122. Id. at 102.
123. See generally, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CoRNEti, L. REv. 1259 (2000); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 52. Carbado & Gulati call this
type of activity "comforting", as it provides comfort to insiders about the visible presence of
outsiders. Carbado & Gulati, supra, at 1301-04 (naming this type of activity "comforting,"
as it provides comfort to insiders about the presence of outsiders).
124. GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 6, at 102.
125. Id. at 130.
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And yet Goffman's analysis provides a dialectical element to his
description of stigma. If specific performances involving passing and
covering serve to reproduce the basic lexical meanings of traits and the
basic social structures that are signified by them, the same
microinteractions may, by complexifying those interactions, destabilize the
lexicon.
B. GLBT Visibility and Microperformances
Carlos Ball recently observed that "[i]n many ways, overcoming
invisibility is the first step in successfully demanding basic civil rights.'
126
With regard to GLBTQ issues, Danaya Wright writes, "[t]he history of the
gay rights movement ...has been a history of making homosexuality
visible."' 127 This is not new news, and a number of scholars have explored
this idea. 28 In a recent article about marriage equality in New Jersey, I
showed how visibility led to piecemeal acceptance of GLBTQ folk, which
in turn made it possible to claim plausibly, within the last fifteen years, that
same sex couples should be recognized as full citizens and should therefore,
as committed and loving couples, have access to the benefits, status, and
kinship identity conferred by marriage. 129 As Danaya Wright commented
about a recent event in the history of claims to marriage equality, the
wildcat marriages of early 2004, "[i]t may be that the visibility of over four
thousand gay couples getting married in San Francisco will be more
126. Ball, supra note 88, at 1534.
127. Danaya C. Wright, The Logic and Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Politics of Privacy, 15 U. FL. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y. 403, 408 (2004). See generally SUZANNA
DANUTA WALTERS, ALL THE RAGE: THE STORY OF GAY VISIBILITY IN AMERICA (2001)
(describing the increase in gay visibility in America).
128. See Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From the Well of Loneliness
to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 401, 401 (2001) (providing a helpful survey of the
history of the interrelated expectations that homosexuals should remain invisible or else be
ashamed of their visibility); see also Abrams, supra note 54, at 413-15 (describing an
interrelationship of literal visibility, political visibility, and programmatic visibility as a way
of describing the mechanism of advancing the interests of stigmatized groups); Schacter,
supra note 55, at 403 (describing how coerced gay invisibility limits both the ability to
participate in lawmaking processes and the extent of more diffuse social knowledge about
gays).
129. See Poirier, supra note 87, at 313-18 (describing access to the psychological
parent doctrine in terms of a specific individual's performance of an acceptable idealized
parental identity).
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effective in eradicating discrimination that the legal changes required by
Lawrence [v. Texas.]"0
30
This visibility is not simply a matter of discovering something
previously hidden, though that is in part how it may be experienced by
those who choose to be visible. GLBT visibility without shame can lead to
a dialogical and dialectical renegotiation of the interpretation of key social
structures, including the status of same-sex couples and of homosexuality
and heterosexuality generally, as well as of the meaning of marriage. This
is a helpful point to keep in mind in considering the larger dynamics of
Kulturkampf around same-sex couples. Much of the offense to
traditionalists by same-sex couples claiming access to marriage lies in their
visible daily performances without shame of the small rituals and
interactions that signal the presence of a married couple.13' This set of
unauthorized, visible microperformances is every bit as troublesome to the
traditionalist as opening the legal definition of marriage to same-sex
couples. 32 Both visible microperformances and legal challenges are claims
of access to normal status, though in different ways, and both threaten to
destabilize the traditionalists' understanding of the shared understanding of
marriage. 133  They might disrupt the transmission of important cultural
practices, intergenerationally as well as among members of the same
generation, that through the institution of marriage reaffirm traditional
identity characteristics and kinship status around sex, gender, and sexual
orientation. 1
3 4
130. Wright, supra note 127, at 408 (referring to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), which decided that sodomy laws are unconstitutional as a matter of constitutionally-
guaranteed liberty). The so-called wildcat marriages in California that Wright referred to
were invalidated in Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
The principle behind them was vindicated in the California Supreme Court's 2008 decision
finding a state constitutional right to marriage equality. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal 2008). A November 2008 referendum raised the issue yet again, adopting Proposition
8, which provides that only a marriage between a man and a woman, will be valid and
recognized in California. A lawsuit has now been filed challenging the underlying validity
of Proposition 8. See California Voters Overrule State Supreme Court on Marriage;
Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Legal Challenges, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTEs, Dec. 2008, at
1 (summarizing the referendum and subsequent court suits and putting them in political and
legal context). Clearly, the struggle on this issue in California is not over.
131. Poirier, supra note 19, at 383-401.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see Linda S. Eckols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity
Implications of Same-Gender Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 353, 354 (1999) (stating
that "[slame-gender marriage is about people searching for integrated identities and others
jealously and fearfully guarding their own"). I made similar arguments in another article,
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Curiously, when I went to prepare a footnote on the usages of the term
"microperformance" in the legal literature, it turns out that there aren't any
in the law review articles searchable on Westlaw, other than my own.
135
This is not to say that the concept isn't out there, in fact well-entrenched in
a couple of legal academic fields, including antidiscrimination law 3 6 and
other contexts. 37  It is also related to the more familiar concept of
"microaggression" relied on in some of the critical race literature.
38
whose basic point was that the key arenas of engagement in the Kulturkampf over sex and
gender, of which the marriage equality controversy is a part, occur on the one hand locally
and on the other in territorial discursive spaces such as media accounts, in which a broad and
anonymous public encounters images and descriptions of marriage. Marc R. Poirier, Same-
Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the Kulturkampf: Why Federalism Is Not the Main
Event, 17 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS L. REV. 387, 390-92 (2008). A third article, not yet in
print, explores the various arenas where same-sex marriage is understood to occur and be
understood; the article includes a section on daily microperformances of married status, as
well as a section on battles over the location of same-sex weddings. Marc R. Poirier,
Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where Is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FLA. INT'L. U. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2008).
135. Search for "microperformance!" in the Westlaw journals database, Sept. 1, 2008.
A similar search turns up precious little on Google.
136. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DuKE L.J. 365 (1991) (discussing Rogers v. American Airlines, 527
F.Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a Title VII case about a black woman's cornrow hair styling);
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 701,
701-04 (2001) (discussing identify performance theory); Carbado & Gulati, Working
Identity, supra note 123, at 1267-70 (discussing the relationship between identify
performance and workplace discrimination); Flagg, supra note 65, at 2011-12 (discussing
identify performance and its potential impact on career advancement); Tristin K. Green,
Discomfort at Work: Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REv.
379 (2008)); Harvard Law Review, Notes, Lessons in Transcendence, Forced Associations
and the Military, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1981 (2004); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L.
Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being "Regarded as" Black, and why Title VII Should
apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 1283, 1325-34 (2005)
(stating various shortcomings of antidiscrimination law including taking into account
adjustment of identity performance); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic
Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1134
(2006); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument
Against Neutrality, 83 TEx. L. REv. 167 (2006).
137. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 52 (discussing choices by members of interracial
and same-sex couples about revealing this aspect of their identity through visibility of their
relationships); Frank Rudy Cooper, "Who's The Man?": Masculinities and Police Stops, 18
COLuM. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1257183
(discussing police performance in terms of microperformances of masculinity).
138. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Displacing the Commonplace Intrusion of Whiteness
From Within and Without: The Chicano Fight for Justice in East LA, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1517,
1524-26 (2004) (discussing how racism is perpetuated in everyday life through routine
practices); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565 (1989)
(describing an example of microaggression in a workplace environment); Daniel Sol6rzano,
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Timothy Zick's exploration of "spatial tactics" in First Amendment law
invokes "microgeographic principles" to manage one type of what I would
call microinteractions. 139 In exploring how far beyond the confines of the
home Lawrence's'4° protection of sexual activities extends, both Carlos Ball
and Lior Strahilovitz turn to the management of visible microinteractions as
a way of describing a category of privatized yet public space.
141
Accounts of microaggressions and microinteractions vary in the
attention they pay to a crucial aspect of these interactions. They sometimes
leave unexamined where the identities that individuals bring to
microinteractions come from; and while they may well examine the effects
on individuals of problematic and stigmatizing microinteractions, they may
or may not attend to the dialectical possibilities of using microinteractions
to shift the shared frame within which microinteractions are understood to
take place.
Some years ago, I suggested that exploring how we acquire and use
social categories in our thinking might help to explain systemic resistance
to altering gender schemas, and could suggest avenues for creating
change. 42 Many occupational, familial, and social categories are tagged
cognitively as prototypically male or female. Those tags are acquired from
experience as part of the traits associated with the social categories. We do
not reason down from a superordinal category about the traits of women,
but up from the traits of basic level social categories that happen to be
Walter R. Allen & Grace Carroll, Keeping Race in Place: Racial Microaggressions and
Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, Berkeley, 23 CMCANO-LATINO L.
REv. 15, 15-17 (2002) (discussing Dr. Charles Pierce's' psychological theories of race and
microaggression).
139. See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 439, 452, 493-94, 498-99, 501 (2006) (discussing microgeography,
spatial tactics, and the concept of "place" in First Amendment rights).
140. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
141. Carlos A. Ball, Privacy, Property, and Public Sex, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
(forthcoming 2009); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of
Sexual Privacy after Lawrence v. Texas, 54 DEPAuL L. REv. 671 (2005); see also John
Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265 (2001) (discussing spatial separation
solutions to moral offenses).
142. Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1073, 1076
(1999). This argument also appears in a short section of Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias A
Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 459, 492 (2003). A related
argument about the perpetuation of a particular version of masculinity (one excluding sissies
as positive role models for boys) was used to explain the cultural stakes in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Marc R. Poirier, Hastening the Kulturkampf: Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of American Masculinity, 12 LAW & SEXUALrrY
271 (2003).
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gendered as we encounter them in everyday life. For example, if we see
only female nurses, nurses will be understood as prototypically female.
Ongoing performances of these gender-tagged categories in real life, as
well as correspondences among various gender-tagged social categories,
constitute processes of homeostasis that make the gender tags difficult to
eliminate. I suggested that disrupting the (re)production of the gender tags
through counterexamples or counter images of the categories might help to
reduce the resistance to a stereotypical person appearing in gender-tagged
occupational and social roles, and might even eliminate the stereotypical
gender associations altogether.
Applying the increasingly sophisticated social science understanding
of cognitive bias and stereotyping processes, academics are now applying
these principles to recommend approaches to the reduction of bias in
various situations. Tristin Green, for example, adapts principles of
workplace appearance discrimination law to her understanding of the way
in which stereotypes are perpetuated in workplace microinteractions.143
Jerry Kang, attuned to the way in which images of race perpetuate
stereotypes, explores possibilities of manipulating the images in our cultural
environment in order to reduce racial bias.144
Microperformances of marriage, including those of same-sex
marriage, whether legally authorized or not, are likewise part of a "diffuse,
collective practice of signification.', 45  I believe that the possibility of
social change in such a practice, whether viewed as a culture, a ritual, a
language, or a gender role, "vitally depends on shifts in individual
performances, and eventually on larger-scale systematic and formal
amendments of these cultural practices in the course of reproducing
them." 1
46
143. Green, supra note 136.
144. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1489 (2005).
145. Poirier, supra note 19, at 384.
146. Id.; see also BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 127-63; David Van
Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning, Social Change, and the Law, 81 Nw. L. REv. 894, 904-09
(1987) (arguing that theories of social change through law must be grounded in an
understanding of diffuse social practices and the ways in which they both facilitate and
hinder change); Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 963, 996-99 (1991) (describing the ever-present process of disintegration and
recuperation of shared understandings among members of a community in terms of"slippage"); supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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C. Covering: And What Lies Underneath?
Kenji Yoshino's scholarship often addresses themes of visibility and
invisibility, identity and stigma, and identity performance. 147 Here, I focus
on Covering (the article) and COVERING (the book). Yoshino follows a
similar structure in both versions, identifying three successive stages in the
legal stigmatization of gay and lesbian identity, which correspond to
demands to convert, 148 to pass, 149 and to cover. 150 He then compares the
existence of covering demands for gays and lesbians to covering demands
in other areas of antidiscrimination law-race 5' and sex. 152 In the
introductions and in theoretical discussions throughout both versions of his
work, but especially towards the conclusions, Yoshino considers
implications of his observations. Here however the two efforts differ
147. In addition to Covering (the article) and COVERING (the book), principal works
involving visibility and identity include Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal
Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 108 YALE
L.J. 485 (1998) and Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for
Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1755 (1996).
148. See COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 31-49 (discussing the means and
methods used to attempt conversion of gay individuals and the pressure for gay individuals
to convert); Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 784-811 (discussing attempts to convert
gay individuals and the pressure for gay individuals to convert).
149. See COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 50-74 (discussing the phenomenon of
gay individuals passing as heterosexual); Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 811-36
(discussing the author's own experience with attempting to pass and feeling pressure to pass
as heterosexual in a work environment, as well as the historical context of passing, and the
legal contexts of passing).
150. See COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 74-107 (discussing what Yoshino
considers the final phase, covering, wherein openly gay individuals struggle about whether
and how much to assimilate to mainstream culture through their appearance, affiliation,
activism, and association); Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 836-64 (discussing
covering in the cultural contexts and tensions that exist between gay culture and mainstream
culture).
151. See COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 111-41 (discussing the concept of
covering as it relates to racial minorities and the author's own experiences as a racial
minority faced with choices about covering); Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 875-
900 (discussing covering behavior in racial minorities as well as the "antidiscrimination
schism" existing between the gay community and racial minorities, the former of which
often has a more difficult time passing and covering).
152. See COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 142--64 (discussing the concept of
covering and explaining that females feel pressure to cover by acting more like their male
counterparts and also feel pressure to reverse-cover by submitting to participation in
stereotypical female behaviors); Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 905-19 (discussing
ways that race-based and sexual orientation-based covering both converge with and diverge
from sex-based covering and discussing the reverse-covering expected from women).
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considerably. COVERING (the book) "reframes Yoshino's argument in a
way that seems simultaneously to expand and to undermine the central idea
of [Covering (the article)].' 53  It moves from an exploration of a
complexified equality rationale for protecting certain groups to a liberty
rationale that apparently can be applied to any demand that an individual
behave in a way that is not authentic to her/him.
154
In Covering (the article), Yoshino presents a classical model of
identity, which he then critiques. Yoshino provides a graphic
representation of this classical mode: it looks like a target, with concentric
circles around a bull's eye-"being" is at the center, the bull's eye. 155 This
diagram suggests that an individual's being is both real and central. To be
sure, Yoshino points out that some activities denominated covering are
often experienced as deeply constitutive of identity, not as relatively
superficial. 5 6 The classical model that conceives of a "being" at the center
is already problematic. 1
57
Indeed, at the end of Covering (the article), Yoshino explores the
argument that "the concept of covering essentializes identity in a way that is
ultimately damaging to its possessor."'158 The idea that there is underlying
identity being covered "may misdescribe the way in which identities are
experienced."'159  Yoshino provides the example of Ann Hopkins, the
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,160 a celebrated employment
153. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, supra note 10, at 1812.
154. See id. at 1818 (pointing out that authenticity lies at the center of the new form of
civil rights Yoshino declares, but that Yoshino fails to define authenticity).
155. See Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 774 (depicting graphically the three
assimilationist demands of conversion, passing, and covering).
156. See id. ("I later revise this model by noting that some activities denominated as
covering are often deeply constitutive of identity. Yet it is heuristically useful to develop the
classical model before challenging it in this way.").
157. See id. (presenting other theoretical constructs, which he calls the strong and weak
performative models of identity); see also id. at 865-75 (suggesting that a weak
performative model, in which covering sometimes is constitutive of identity, is probably
accurate, though Yoshino stops short of elaborating in any detail).
158. Id. at 933.
159. Id.
160. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(m). The Court held that (1) when a plaintiff in a Title VH case proves
that her gender played a part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid finding
liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision if it had not taken plaintiff's gender into account and (2) that evidence was
sufficient to establish that sexual stereotyping played a part in evaluating the plaintiffs
candidacy. Id.; see Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-102 (2003) (interpreting
the evidentiary standard of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in mixed-motive Title VH cases).
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discrimination case that turned, inter alia, on holdings about sex
stereotyping of an employee by the employer. 16' Hopkins prevailed on an
argument that if she could show that she had been denied partnership in an
accounting firm in part because she did not conform to stereotypes of
female behavior, such a motive would constitute prohibited sex
discrimination under Title VII, unless the employer could show that the
same decision would have been made without regard to her gender.
162
Yoshino argues, "[w]e can easily imagine Hopkins taking umbrage at the
allegation that she was covering some deeper womanhood in being an
aggressive, intelligent, high-power manager. She might say that she was
just being herself."'163  Yoshino thus posits a hypothetical individual's
experience of non-stereotypical but authentic traits against a legal theory
that requires us first to identify certain characteristic traits of our legally
protected categories in order to ascertain when impermissible coerced
covering has occurred. "If feminine behavior is protected because it is
constitutive of being a woman, then nonfeminine women like Hopkins will
be told that they are covering simply because they do not conform to that
stereotype."' 164  More generally, if we identify particular traits as
constitutive of identities, we unfortunately "essentializ[e] those identities as
always embodying those traits."'165 Then"[t]he real question will arise of
how to determine which traits will 'count' as traits that ought to be
protected against covering demands."' 166
Some individuals will experience their covering behavior as
compelled, that is, modulated systematically in order to assimilate.
167
Others may experience the same behavior as not an accession to others'
161. See Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 905-13, 933 (discussing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) and elaborating on the identity of the plaintiff,
Ann Hopkins).
162. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion) (establishing that gender played a
motivating part shifts burden of proof to defendant); id. at 255-58 (upholding finding that
sex stereotyping played a part in the employment decision); id. at 272 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("She [Ann Hopkins] had proved that participants in the process considered her
failure to conform to the stereotypes credited by a number of the decisionmakers had been a
substantial factor in the decision.").
163. Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 933.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 937.
167. See Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, supra note 10, at 1292-94 (stating that
sometimes the covering performance is compelled).
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norms, but as their own individual authentic expression of their identity.'
68
Yoshino briefly explores an approach to describing the harm of covering by
letting the individual determine whether s/he feels s/he is being forced to
cover.169 But Yoshino points out that this places the burden on minority
groups to justify their own behavior, which he finds unacceptable. 70
I mention in passing another difficulty with an authenticity-based
account of covering. When we protect only certain aspects of identity-
race, gender, and to some extent sexual orientation-why those? An
approach offered by others to this question involves protecting traits that
correspond historically to subordinated identities. 171 Of course, then we
have to sort out what those are or ought to be.
Yoshino ultimately turns to one of Goffman's ideas as a way of
accounting for the harm of coerced covering. 72 Yoshino reminds us that
Goffman views social presentations not as an activity of a performer
standing alone but as "a gesture between a performer and a highly
particularized audience.' 73 One therefore has to take account of "not only
covering performances made by the performer, but of the covering demands
made by the audience."'174  Shifting the focus from the performer to the
168. See id. (arguing that Yoshino has not sufficiently explored the question of when an
individual's covering or flaunting behavior is just strategic, as opposed to problematically
coerced).
169. Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 936
170. See id. ("In such circumstances, leaving it to the individual to determine whether
she is covering or not risks blaming the victim. It smacks yet again of placing the
responsibility for identity on the individual who is being disadvantaged on the basis of that
identity.").
171. See RICHARD R. FoRD, RACIAL CULTURE: ACRITIQUE 123 (2005):
Anti-discrimination law should be refined so as to recognize only those
differences attributable to the production of formal status hierarchy, for the
purpose of eliminating or reducing the ill effects of such hierarchies. Difference
discourse, by metastasizing status in a thick social identity, distracts from and
confuses the vital task of correcting status hierarchy.
Id.; see also Richard Ford, Race As Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1803
(2000) (challenging the attempt to expand civil rights by protecting cultural differences and
identity correlated traits, and arguing that "antiracism... is best understood as a response to
a specific history of subordination"). See generally Green, supra note 136; Kimberly A.
Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83
TEx. L. REV. 167 (2006).
172. See Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 936-37.
173. Id. at 937.
174. Id.
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audience, Yoshino argues that we should be asking whether covering
demands are being made, not whether the agent is being forced to cover.
75
Russell Robinson points out one problem with this proposed focus on
covering demands: we often cannot tell what would constitute a covering
demand. 76 He observes, "Rarely does covering stem from something clean
and unyielding enough to be called a 'demand. '"1 77 Often, "it is perceived
by the individual based on her prior experience, interpretations of
ambiguous statements, and readings of body language, silences and
gestures, among other things."17 8 Overall, Robinson argues, the psychology
of covering is complex, especially once we think of it as an interactive
process. 79 I agree with Robinson's view that Yoshino has not provided a
particularly nuanced or realistic account of covering demands.
80
Yoshino's proposal to focus on covering demands has intuitive appeal,
in that it is congruent with our notion of discrimination and stigmatic
stereotyping and wrongful action, as a harm imposed by others on
individuals who are entitled to pursue their own chosen identity
performances. Perhaps this very intuitive appeal is unfortunate, for it leads
us to focus on the stereotypers as wrongful actors upon innocent and
passive victims, and to overlook the dynamic potential that always is
present in microperformances of identity. The individual to whom a
covering demand is addressed is always engaged in a dramaturgical,
diachronic, dialectic process, as Goffman's careful descriptions suggest.
S/he can in fact her/himself sometimes play some role in shifting the
(re)production of stigmatized identity. So we must approach Yoshino's
notion of covering demands as the source of the problem with caution.
At least, though, in Covering (the article), Yoshino arrives at the point
of problematizing covering as an ongoing, iterative identity process. In
COVERING (the book) he appears to take a step backwards into the classical
model. He "argue[s] for a new civil rights paradigm that moves away from
175. See id. ("Asking whether B is covering seems much less relevant to an anti-
homophobic project than asking whether B's audience is demanding that he cover.").
176. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, supra note 10, at 1836-38
177. Id. at 1836.
178. Id. at 1835.
179. See id. at 1838 (discussing the complex internal and external variables involved in
covering).
180. See id. (arguing that if Yoshino had developed an account of the internal
psychological dynamics of covering, his account would have been "more realistic and
nuanced").
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group-based equality rights toward universal liberty rights .... 181  The
new model is all about a "quest of authenticity.' 182 Yoshino seeks to found
his new paradigm on a universal "desire for authenticity, our common
human wish to express ourselves without being impeded by unreasoning
demands for conformity."'' 83 At the end of COVERING (the book) Yoshino
goes full throttle into authenticity, invoking a distinction between the True
Self and the False Self of psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott.184 He writes,
"Winnicott posits that each of us has a True Self that must be expressed for
us to have the feeling of being switched on, of being alive." 185 The False
Self "embodies our ambivalence about assimilation, which is both
necessary to survival and obstructive of life."' 86 The goal, therefore, is to
keep assimilation to a minimum. Yoshino argues that people respond
intuitively to Winnicott's terms, thus establishing the universality of a
desire for authenticity.
187
First of all, it is not clear to me that everyone shares a desire for
authenticity. Some folks have a desire for power, and authenticity would
only get in the way.188 Some folks may understand that there is no self to
181. COVERING (the book) supra note 10, at 27.
182. Id.
183. Id. at xii; see also Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, supra note 10, at 1292 ("[Tlhe
unmistakable image at the core of [Yoshino's] book is that of a literally self-centered quest
for individual authenticity.").
184. See COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 184-86. But cf. Nussbaum, supra note
10, at 25 (arguing that Yoshino has not given a sufficiently subtle account of Winnicott, who
uses True Self/False Self in different ways in different parts of his work). It may well be
accurate to say that many people think of themselves as having a separate, stable core
identity, and that Winnicott at times refers to the longing after a better expression of that
supposed authentic core. That is a different matter altogether from saying that there really is
a stable and authentic core identity outside of ongoing social processes of mutual interaction
and performance. Yoshino's invocation of the quest for authenticity occupies only a few
pages of COVERING (the book) though they are strategically placed in introductory and
concluding sections, and commentators have correctly noted their importance to his revised
account of the process of covering. All the same, perhaps Yoshino could clarify in the
future, locating the individual sense of authenticity he relies on within an ongoing process of
negotiating the self over time.
185. COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 186.
186. Id.
187. See id. ("When I describe the uncovered self in Winnicott's terms, many people
respond immediately with stories that attest to the concept's universality.").
188. See ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF POWER xvii-xxii (1998) (providing a
modem day version of principles to guide a Machiavellian approach to one's life); see also
ELEANOR D. PAYSON, THE WIZARD OF OZ AND OTHER NARCISSISTS: COPING WITH THE ONE-
WAY RELATIONSHIP IN WORK, LOVE, AND FAMILY 1-34 (2002) (describing a narcissistic
personality type concerned excessively with self).
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hold an identity, and that that position need not lead to an unprincipled
relativism but can form the basis of a clear and ethical life. 89 For instance,
Paul Horwitz, in critiquing Yoshino, invokes Charles Taylor's account of
human identity as fundamentally dialogical. 190  Horwitz argues that
"Yoshino's treatment of authenticity and identity leaves much to be
desired."' 91  He points out that elaboration of authentic identity is not
necessarily the most important work we can do, and that "[o]ur truest, most
authentic selves are often those we form in moments of dialogue and
interaction with others." 192  For Horwitz, the self is fluid, complex, and
irreducibly social. 193 Moreover, "identity, whatever its sources, is not
simply a thing we possess; it is a thing we use."1 94  We may ethically
choose to highlight or submerge one aspect or another of our self; and it is
not clear which of these is our true self.
195
189. See BARRY MAGID, ENDING THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: A ZEN GUIDE 22-27
(2008) (presenting the Buddhist teaching that the self is defined by others and one's relation
to them, that the self is actually the "thousand guises" of the self, and that an attempt to grasp
the essence of the self is misguided). This principle of no separate self, fundamental to
Buddhist teachings, need not lead to a relativistic and unethical life. See NORMAN FISCHER,
TAKING OUR PLACES: THE BUDDHIST PATH TO TRULY GROWING UP 141-84 (2003) (setting
forth the principles of ethical conduct in a Buddhist system of ethics); JOHN DAIDO Loom,
THE HEART OF BEING: THE MORAL AND ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF BUDDHISM 50-116, 132-65,
169-250 (1996) (describing the Buddhist Precepts, the vows taken at initiation, their ethical
significance, and a modem interpretation of these precepts).
One can also develop an ethics within postmodernism. See, e.g., Gowri
Ramachandran, Book Review: Manliness by Harvey Mansfield, 19 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM
201, 217-18 (2007) (presenting an ethical postmodemism). Ramachandran writes:
Firm opposition to a rigid role or identity may not necessarily equate to extreme
forms of individualistic libertarianism and anarchism, or even nihilism.
Postmodem theorists are not inspired by Nietzche and Foucault alone .... A
better reading perhaps is that postmodernists and queer theorists are in favor of
ethics or morals, but have the humility to realize that an appropriate ethics and
morality is contingent on the society we currently inhabit .... So they limit
themselves to exposing the fact that these social roles, moralities, and ethical
rules are ones we choose, that we bear responsibility for, and that are therefore
always subject to contest.
Id.
190. Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, supra note 10, at 1290-92 (discussing CHARLES
TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1992)).
191. Id. at 1284.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1292. As Martha Nussbaum points out, covering can sometimes be no more
than an exercise of discretion, and discretion is often a social good. Nussbaum, supra note
10, at 25.
195. Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, supra note 10, at 1294.
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Identity performance may be modulated depending not only on the
immediate audience, but also on the place in which microperformances
occur. Of relevance here is a fascinating sociological study of gay male
identity in a New Jersey suburb, Peacocks, Chameleons, Centaurs: Gay
Suburbia and the Grammar of Social Identity.196 Author Wayne Brekhus
discerns three approaches to being gay in a city an hour from New York
City. One group, whom he dubs "peacocks," are visibly gay all the time.
197
Another, the "centaurs," have integrated their gayness into their suburban
lives. 198 A third, the "chameleons," vary their identity performance around
their gay identity depending on their location at the time. 199 In the suburbs,
they are much less visible than in gay neighborhoods of New York City.
200
Brekhus seeks to develop from his study a more general theory of
differential identity performance, to develop "a grammar of the
microecology of identity. ',2°1 The more theoretical aspects of Brekhus'
work take us too far afield of this article, but they are notable as a
contemporary and non-deconstructionist approach to describing identity
processes that rejects the kind of essentializing that Yoshino has included in
COVERING (the book).
Brekhus takes his ethnographic observations in the direction of a
theory of socially-situated identity. I would like to take them in a slightly
different direction, albeit one that is largely beyond the scope of this article.
Clearly at least some folks modulate their microperformances of identity
depending on place, and GLBTQ folks are no exception. For the same
reasons, GLBTQ folks have sometimes physically relocated themselves to
communities where their everyday performances of identity will be more in
sync with those of their neighbors.0 2 The interactional and dialogical
196. WAYNE K. BREKHUS, PEACOCKS, CHAMELEONS, CENTAURS: GAY SUBURBIA AND
THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL IDENTITY (2003).
197. Id. at 35-47.
198. Id. at 74-94.
199. Id. at48-73.
200. See id. at 50 (describing chameleons as individuals who "live in heterosexual
space and commute to gay space to 'turn on' their gay selves").
201. Id. at 1. In fact, Brekhus consciously models on Goffman his attempt to generalize
from specific observations of highly local performances to a more general theory of identity.
Id. at 9.
202. See id. at 10 (exploring differences between urban and suburban environments
influence on gay identity); see also Lauren Berlant & Michael Warner, Sex in Public, in
PUBLICS AND COUNTERPUBLICS 187, 191-92, 203-04 (Michael Warner ed., 2002)
(describing how public sex shops and other visible places of sexually-charged encounters
helped to create urban neighborhoods hospitable to open GLBT identity); MANUEL
CASTELLS, Cultural Identity, Sexual Liberation and Urban Structure: The Gay Community
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aspects of microperformances of identity thus generate interjurisdictional
movement. This in turn can eventually create communities that are locally
differentiated around identity performance and become differentiated
around the lexicons with which these performances are interpreted. These
jurisdictions may then generate different local politics. 20 3 If this sounds too
theoretical, we can appreciate the evolution of gay neighborhoods in San
Francisco (the Castro) and New York City (the West Village and then
Chelsea) and the cultural differentiation of various localities in Colorado
2°4
as such phenomena. The current controversy in Ocean Grove, New Jersey,
over civil unions in its beachfront Pavilion 20 5 is the result of migration by
gay and lesbian couples in an attempt to secure a welcoming place to live,
against a reassertion by a major real estate owner and manager of that
place's traditional strict Methodist identity.
III. Regarding Same-Sex Couples: Some Observations
Three specific examples show some of the ways microperformances
by same-sex couples are implicated in legal disputes over the recognition of
in San Francisco, in THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS: A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY OF
URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 138-70 (1983) (studying the concentration of gay populations
in certain neighborhoods in San Francisco); CARL F. STYcHIN, GOVERNING SEXUALITY: THE
CHANGING POLITICS OF CMZENSHIP AND LAW REFORM 94-95 (2003) (discussing gay and
lesbian migrations); Kenneth L. Karst, Local Discourse and the Social Issues, 12 CARDOZO
STUD. L. & LIT. 1, 21-22 (2000) (discussing how public places such as gay bars created a
sense of community and shared identity); Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity
Processes, and the Kulturkampf, supra note 134, at 406 (describing the importance of
visibility in public places to GLBT identity); id. at 415-17 (describing gay and lesbian
migrations to local neighborhoods and communities); Robert R.M. Verchick, Same-Sex and
the City, 37 URB. LAW. 191, 192-94 (2004) (noting and exploring consequences of the
migration of GLBT folk to certain urban centers). See generally GARY J. GATES & JASON
OST, THE GAY & LESBIAN ATLAS (2004) (using 2000 census data to demonstrate in detail the
spatial distribution of gay and lesbian couples).
203. See, e.g., Darren Rosenblum, Overcoming "Stigmas": Lesbian and Gay Districts
and Black Electoral Empowerment, 39 How. L. J. 149, 169-94 (1995) (describing the
clustering of gay and lesbian residents in specific urban neighborhoods and consequent
eventual local political power). See generally BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE
CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING Us APART 6 (2008) (discerning an
increasing trend for Americans to move to communities full of like-minded neighbors, and
decrying the effects of this ideological sorting on national politics).
204. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REv. 1011, 1042-45 (2005) (noting that
the politics of this differentiation of culture led to Colorado's constitutional Amendment 2,
which was successfully challenged in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
205. See infra Part I.B.
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same-sex marriage. The first is an Eleventh Circuit case, Shahar v.
Bowers,2 6 in which public employment with the Georgia State Attorney
General's Office was denied to a lesbian because she would appear to the
public to be married to her same-sex partner. The second is an ongoing
controversy in Ocean Grove, New Jersey, over whether New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination requires a religiously-affiliated corporation to rent a
beachfront Pavilion, often used for weddings, to same-sex couples who live
in the community, so that they may celebrate civil union ceremonies there.
The third example is a mass communication, a cautionary "Joint Advisory"
e-letter issued jointly by LGBT advocacy groups on the occasion of the
momentous 2008 California Supreme Court decision on marriage
equality.2 °7
A. Shahar v. Bowers °"
Robin Shahar (n6e Brown),2 9 while a law student at Emory, received
an offer of employment from the State of Georgia's Department of the
Attorney General. 210  During the summer before her employment was to
begin, she married her female partner in a Jewish Reconstructionist
ceremony, in a public park in South Carolina, with some 250 guests
attending.21' She invited two of her future work colleagues to the wedding
206. 114 F.3d 1097 (1lth Cir. 1997) (en banc).
207. Make Change, supra note 16 (providing guidance to the GBLT community
following In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.2d 384 (Cal. 2008)).
208. 114 F.3d 1097 (11 th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
209. Robin Brown and her partner Francine Greenfield both changed their last name to
Shahar after they were married. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1100 & n.4. They understood "Shahar"
to mean in Hebrew "the act of seeking God." Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1128 n.1
(11 th Cir.) (Kravitch, J., dissenting), rev'd, 114 F.3d 1097 (11 th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
210. 114F.3dat100.
211. Id. Yoshino provides a description of the facts in Shahar derived from several
sources that differs in some respects from the court's description. COVERING (the book),
supra note 10, at 93-101. Mary Anne Case considers an earlier round of the Shahar case in
her discussion of visible pair bonds in public employment discrimination. Case, supra note
49, at 1669-71. For an analysis of Shahar in terms of whether its application of First
Amendment free speech in the public employment context is correct, see generally Bryan H.
Wildenthal, To Say "I Do": Shahar v. Bowers, Same-Sex Marriage, and Public Employee
Free Speech Rights, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 381 (1998). For a critique of the Shahar court's
excessive reliance on discriminatory public opinion, see generally Michele L. Booth,
Comment, Shahar v. Bowers: Is Public Opinion Transformed into a Legitimate Government
Interest when Government Acts as Employer?, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1235 (1998).
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and spoke openly about the future wedding and her marriage.212 In various
other ways she held herself out to be married.1 3 The Department revoked
her employment offer.214 Shahar then challenged the revocation on various
federal constitutional grounds.215
In affirming the government's motion for summary judgment and
dismissing Shahar's motion for summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit en
banc majority focused on Shahar's claims of intimate association and
expressive association.216 Assuming arguendo that these claims were
valid,217 it held that they were, nevertheless, outweighed by the
government's interest in the effective operation of the Attorney General's
Office.218 Shahar's behavior, according to the Attorney General, was
characterized by the following: it had a realistic likelihood of affecting her
credibility and the Department's credibility; it might affect the
Department's ability to handle certain controversial matters, including
claims to same-sex marriage licenses, homosexual parental rights,
employment-based insurance coverage of domestic partners, and
enforcement of Georgia's sodomy statute; and it might harm public
perception of the Department. 219 In addition, the court observed, Shahar's
failure to appreciate the importance of appearances and the need to avoid
212. Shahar, 114F.3d at 1100.
213. Id. at 1100-01, 1105 n.17, 1107 (explaining that Shahar likely engaged in sexual
activity with her partner, used the words "marriage" and "wedding," exchanged and wore a
wedding ring, listed herself as engaged on her job application, changed her surname,
obtained a married rate for insurance, jointly owned a house, and cohabitated).
214. Id.at 1101.
215. Id. (grounding the challenge in free exercise of religion, freedom of association,
equal protection, and substantive due process).
216. Id. at 1099, 1102 (noting quickly that "even when we assume, for argument's sake,
that either the right to intimate association or the right to expressive association or both are
present, we know they are not absolute").
217. Id. at 1100, 1102, 1106.
218. The majority analyzed the case as a government employment case, in which the
government interest in its operations must be balanced against the employee's interest in free
speech. Id. at 1102 (citing Board of County Commr's, Wabaunsee Cy., Kan. v. Umbehr,
518 U.S. 668 (1996); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education
of Township High School District, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
219. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1104-05, 1105 n.16. In its more extended discussion of the
propriety of allowing public perception to influence the employment of public officials, the
court relied principally on a case upholding the firing of a sheriff's clerical employee after
he made an off-duty statement that he participated in recruiting activities of the Ku Klux
Klan. Id. at 1108-11 (discussing McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
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bringing controversy caused the Attorney General to lose confidence in her
judgment.22°
This case is all about appearances, the public appearances of being a
same-sex couple, and a married one at that. 221
Even if Shahar is not married to another woman, she, for appearance
purposes, might as well be. We suppose that Shahar could have done
more to "transform" her intimate relationship into a public statement.
But after (as she says) "sanctifying" the relationship with a large
"wedding" ceremony by which she became-and remains for all to
see-"married," she has done enough to warrant the Attorney General's
concern. He could conclude that her acts could give rise to a likelihood
of confusion in the minds of the public: confusion about her marital
status and about his attitude on same-sex marriage and related issues.
222
This central passage is in important measure about to whom the law
assigns authoritative control over the interpretation of Robin Shahar's
behavior, by herself and with her partner Francine. The court implied that
Shahar created the conflict by making a "public statement" out of an
"intimate relationship. '" 223  Shahar pointed out that her wedding and
marriage occurred in a non-employment-related context and that "she took
no action to transform her intimate association into a public or political
statement., 224  Moreover, Shahar never claimed that any civil or legal
consequence would or should follow from her religious marriage. 2 5
220. Id. at 1105-06.
221. There's that troubling word "public" again.
222. Id. at 1107.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1106 (quoting Shahar).
225. Id. Nor did she ever seek a civil marriage in Georgia or claim another of the
benefits of civil marriage. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1118 (Godbold, J., dissenting); id. at 1127
n.3 (Birch, J., dissenting).
Shahar did however invite future work colleagues to the wedding, describe herself
as "engaged" on an employment form, and talk about the marriage. Id. at 1105-18. She was
not so silent about her non-work related performance as James Dale. Dale, it may be
recalled, came out in the context of his life as a Rutgers University student, which was
reported in the newspapers. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644-45 (2000). But
he never came out or in any way indicated homosexuality in the places and spaces controlled
by the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court interpreted
Dale's membership and (tellingly) his physical presence in a Boy Scout uniform as
sufficiently problematic, in terms of the message the BSA wished to convey, to allow the
BSA claim of expressive association to trump Dale's argument that he had confined his
visible identity as a gay man to a sphere other than that of the BSA. Id. at 644. See
Christopher S. Hargis, Note, The Scarlet Letter "H": The Brand Left after Dale, 11 LAW &
SExuALrr" 209, 224-40 (2002) (arguing that Dale treats homosexuals as branded, making
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Given this article's discussion of the way in which identity involves
microperformances and recognition by others, it is hard to accept altogether
Shahar's account of her actions, if she means to say that her actions were
not intended to be available to the public as an interpretive audience to
whom and for whom she was offering microperformances of the identity
she claimed. Of course her actions were public. Her wedding was public,
and her life with her partner, although intimate, was also in many ways
public. Wedding ceremonies connect the couple both to whatever public
attends the ceremony or is aware of it, and to whatever tradition the
ceremony invokes and (re)produces. 226 Afterwards, many of the small
microperformances of married life reinforce the kinship categories
227
(re)produced by marriage, and make them normal and natural. Shahar
surely intended to "transform" her relationship and her identity through the
wedding as well as through the prior and subsequence microperformances
that she and Francine engaged in as part of taking on the lived role of a
couple.
their very existence an expressive activity); Nancy J. Knauer, "Simply So Different": The
Uniquely Expressive Character of the Gay Individual After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
89 Ky. L.J. 997, 1016-20 (2000-2001) (discussing the impact of Dale's mere presence on
the Boy Scouts, according to the analysis in Boy Scouts of America); Poirier, Gender, Place,
Discursive Space, supra note 134 (discussing the Court's description of Mr. Dale as a
disruptive presence in Boy Scouts of America).
226. See Mae Kuykendall, Emersonian Family Values: Claims to Duration and
Renewal in American Narratives of Divorce, Love and Marriage, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 69, 94 (2007) ("[T]he practice of wedding vows is a cultural rehearsal of an embedded
way of reading and reciting the moral aspirations of marriage."). This is so even when the
participants in the wedding are not especially religious. Kuykendall notes:
The use of religious ritual, often by those who borrow religion for the day, is
not, in the common hold of Americans on the format of wedding days of
different traditions, about religious faith. It is more correctly a borrowed
language for a densely packed set of aspirations that contain within them a form
of claims to duration and to happiness.
Id. at 101.
227. See Leslie A. Baxter & Dawn 0. Braithwaite, Performing Marriage: Marriage
Renewal Rituals as Cultural Performance, 67 SOUTHERN COMMUNICATIONS J. 94, 94-95
(2002) (describing marriage as an ongoing discursive accomplishment achieved through a
myriad of interaction practices); Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a
Story About Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living Language, 34 HARV.
Civ. R.-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 385, 416-19 (1999) (describing three ways in which interactions
with others deepen the sense of the reality and validity of the marriage-conversations with
others, interactions with strangers, and encounters with printed forms); see also Poirier,
Cultural Property, supra note 19, at 398-400 (discussing Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-
Sex Marriage).
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This does not mean that Shahar would lack a plausible argument, if
only it were framed a bit differently. It will help if we notice that the
court's majority approached the issue of interpretive community in terms of
a blunt private/public dichotomy ("intimate association"/"public
statement"), with any significant publicity resulting in the loss by the one
228who went public of control over the consequences.  We might instead ask
for which publics-in Goffman's terms, in what contexts, on what stages-
should we understand Shahar's identity performances as part of a married
couple to be permissibly legible.229 What Shahar could plausibly argue is
that she did not mean for her public performances of identity as a Jewish
lesbian in a committed relationship to be available to the interpretive
community delimited by times and places when she was "at work," nor for
it to be a statement about the matters that she would be engaged in "at
work." The contexts in which they could be misunderstood to be claims
about legal relationship were "limited," as Judge Kravitch noted in dissent
in the panel opinion.230  The court's en banc majority opinion, thus,
228. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1107 (explaining that Shahar's actions allowed the
Attorney General to "conclude that her acts would give rise to a likelihood of confusion in
the minds of members of the public: confusion about her marital status and about his
attitude on same-sex marriage and related issues").
229. It will be helpful here to introduce the concept of counterpublics, and perhaps
especially of "subaltern counterpublics," as first articulated by feminist philosopher Nancy
Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing
Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 107, 123-24 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
Fraser critiques as insufficient the theory of a bourgeois public sphere separate from the state
but engaging in important, formative, politically determinative civic discourse, a theory set
out in JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger with Frederick
Lawrence trans., 1989). Fraser argues that such a supposedly uniform and unified public
inevitably excludes subaltern identities such as gender, often in a way that remains
unacknowledged and therefore cannot even be addressed. Fraser, supra, at 117-21.
Separate groups, with their own public civic discourse, can help individuals to engage in a
civic discourse informed by their own experience as subordinated groups. This discourse
will be relatively undistorted by the unacknowledged pressure of the overarching dominant
public sphere. There "subaltern counterpublics," as Fraser names them, are "parallel
discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and
needs." Id. at 123 (footnote omitted). Subaltern counterpublics "emerge in response to
exclusions within dominant publics" and "help to expand discursive space." Id. at 124. In
the long run, despite their separateness, subaltern counterpublics militate against separatism,
precisely because they are public. Id. We will return to the idea of the politics of subaltern
counterpublics in our examination of Make Change in Part II.C infra, and of Judith Butler
on identity performance, in Part IV.B infra.
230. Shahar, 70 F.3d 1218, 1230 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (Kravitch, J., dissenting); see also
Booth, supra note 211, at 1258 (contrasting the level of publicity involved in Shahar with
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undermines Shahar' s ability to control the consequences of her choice to be
visible as part of a same-sex couple, once she is public about it anywhere at
all. She is not allowed to cover at work, to use Yoshino's term. Or, as I
have described the issue elsewhere, she is not allowed to use a zoning
strategy to control the consequences of her microperformances of lesbian
identity by delimiting separate discursive spaces that are not in
communication with one another.23'
The court's refusal to accord Shahar control over the interpretation of
her microperformances is reflected in its decision, in writing the opinion, to
use scare quotes throughout to refer to Shahar's "wedding" and "marriage"
and to use wedding and marriage without the scare quotes only to refer to
legally-sanctioned (and therefore, given the state of the law in Georgia,
opposite-sex) marriages.232 The court graphically distances itself from the
possibility that a same-sex marriage recognized by a religious entity ought
to be given some weight as a constitutional matter, even when not legally
recognized by the civil law.
In dissent, Judge Godbold argues that the Shahars were validly
married in the Jewish Reconstructionist tradition, even if not under the civil
law of Georgia.233 There was a "duality of meaning" as to "marriage" and
"wedding" as well as "spouse., 234 In Judge Godbold's view the Attorney
General acted in serious ignorance of Shahar's religious tradition, without
the much broader publicity at issue in one of the supposedly controlling precedents,
McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1985)).
231. See Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 19, at 407-08 (discussing spatial
separation as a way of managing signal congestion).
232. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1099 n.1 ("For clarity's sake, we use the words 'marriage' and
'wedding' (in quotation marks) to refer to Shahar's relationship with her partner; we use the
word marriage (absent quotation marks) to indicate legally recognized heterosexual
marriage."). Note that the court refers here to legally sanctioned marriage as "heterosexual
marriage." Id. To be technically precise, Georgia did not limit marriage to heterosexuals,
but to opposite sex couples (assuming the male/female binary to be a universal description of
human bodies). Id. Thus, the court could be said to be using sexual orientation language
("heterosexual," presuming sex2 sexual activity between married partners) when a more
accurate choice of language would have used terms for sexl (a male and a female) to
describe the requirements of Georgia's marriage law.
233. Id. at 1118-21 (Godbold, J., dissenting) (giving consideration to the specifics of
the religious nature of the Shahars' marriage as articulated at greater length in the panel
opinion below). Judge Godbold concludes that "the critical facts are that Shahar and her
partner are lifelong adherents to Judaism and good-faith, dedicated participants in the
Reconstructionist Movement; the Reconstructionist Movement is a significant movement
within American Judaism; and it regards same-sex marriage as acceptable and desirable in
preference to couples living together without marriage." Id. at 1120.
234. Id. at 1121, 1122 n.3.
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even trying to find out more about it.235 Thus, the Attorney General could
not properly carry out the constitutionally required balancing test.236
According to Godbold, the en banc majority erred in upholding the
Attorney General's uninformed interpretation and excluding Shahar's
interpretation "as though it did not exist for Shahar and others of her
faith."
237
The controversy here concerns not simply the acts of the Shahars but
the words and lexicon used to describe and interpret them and the broader
claims ascribed to that choice of words. Judge Kravitch in her dissent in
the panel opinion even explored the possibility that there might be a
translation issue: that the controversy might be the result of a choice of
using the language of civil marriage to describe in English a fundamentally
Jewish ritual and status.238 Judge Kravitch also pointed out that "marriage"
can mean merely "an intimate or close union," without the connotations of
legal status ascribed to it by the putative interpreting public in the mind of
the Attorney General. 239 The judge noted, moreover, that there may be no
better English term to express the nature of the relationship, as Robin
Shahar's partner stated in deposition about the use of the term "engaged.t
240
We can, thus, understand the Attorney General's claim as based in a
specific anxiety about the control of the public interpretations of publicly
visible identity performances by a same-sex couple. It asserts control over
these performances (and the labels that generate them and that they may
generate) because Robin Shahar was to become a public employee. Judge
235. See id. at 1122 ("The Attorney General and his staff acted in ignorance of the
religious roots of the association that Shahar planned, the centrality of it to her faith, and the
recognition of it by the religion to which she was committed .... ").
236. See id. ("The actions by the Attorney General do not meet the constitutional
requirements of reasonableness.").
237. Id. at 1121.
238. Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1230 n.7 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing deposition testimony of Rabbi Friedlander, who officiated at the Shahars'
wedding, about the translation of the Hebrew terms).
239. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961)).
240. Id. In response to a question about the use of the word "engaged," Ms. Greenfield
stated:
We are limited by language. It is sort of derived for heterosexuals. We use the
language because we don't have a better one to explain what we are talking
about, but it describes that there is a sense of a commitment relationship, there is
a union to take place, this person is part of my family ....
Id. (quoting Greenfield deposition).
MICROPERFORMANCES OF IDENTITY
Kravitch responded to this implied claim tersely: "Neither 'marriage' nor
'wedding' is a proprietary legal term.', 24 1
Judge Godbold, in his en banc dissent and in his earlier majority
opinion for the Eleventh Circuit panel, does not ground the importance of
the wedding and marriage to the couple in their personal desire to express
their commitment to one another or to the world; rather, he expends
considerable energy exploring the validity of the wedding and marriage
within a recognized religious tradition and the commitment of the couple to
that tradition.242  The identity Shahar claims protection for deserves
protection because it is grounded in her sincere and longstanding
participation in a traditional religious group.243 (Well, not altogether
241. Id. See generally Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 19 (arguing that the
traditionalist claim to restrict access to marriage can best be understood as a type of cultural
property claim, even though there are very good reasons not to grant that claim).
242. Thus Judge Godbold wrote in his panel decision:
The intimate association Shahar asserts is not based upon false or sham
assertions of religious belief, or hasty decision, or overnight conversion. She
and her partner grew up in traditional Jewish families. Shahar attended Hebrew
school from the third grade. She was bat mitzvahed at age 13 and continued in
Hebrew school until she was confirmed at age 16. Greenfield grew up in a
conservative, kosher, Jewish home. She went through Jewish training through
high school, attended Jewish summer camps, and was involved in Jewish youth
groups.
Shahar and Greenfield have been significant participants in the life of their
synagogue, located in Atlanta .... Shahar has led services at the synagogue
and has given several sermons. She and Greenfield often attend together. The
proposed ceremony was announced at a service of the synagogue.
Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1222-23. In his en banc dissent, Judge Godbold concludes, "the critical
facts are that Shahar and her partner are lifelong adherents to Judaism and good-faith,
dedicated participants in the Reconstructionist Movement; the Reconstructionist Movement
is a significant movement within American Judaism; and it regards same-sex marriage as
acceptable and desirable in preference to couples living together without marriage." Shahar,
114 F.3d at 1120.
243. Reconstructionist Judaism is a blend of old and new, though it is typically
welcoming to same-sex couples. The district court in fact considered the depositions of
three rabbis, two Reconstructionist and one Conservative. Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1223
(discussing evidence before the district court). The depositions "reveal that Judaism in the
United States does not have a monolithic view of same-sex marriage." Id. Indeed, Judaism
provides quite an interesting contemporary example of the contest within religious
denominations in western culture around the status of GLBT folks and same-sex couples.
See generally RABBI STEVEN GREENBERG, WRESTLING WITH GOD & MEN: HOMOsEXUALITY
IN THE JEWISH TRADITION (2004) (exploring and applying the Jewish tradition of disputation
to teachings about homosexuality and same-sex couples, focusing on the way Orthodox
Judaism approaches these questions); Jeff Diamant, Gay Unions Gain a Place in
Conservative Judaism: Divisive Votes Also Lifts a Ban on Gay Rabbis, (Newark, N.J.)
STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 7, 2006, at 1; Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Jews Allow Gay Rabbis
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traditional.) We could distinguish Judge Godbold's reasoning from the
claims sometimes made on behalf of marriage equality, that marriage
constitutes a unique expressive resource to which individuals need access in
order to express themselves about their relationships and identities. 2"
Godbold's concern is not with protection of a pre-existing authentic self,
seeking to express itself however it chooses, but rather with appropriate
constitutional protection of the Shahars' ability to participate in an identity
(re)producing religious tradition without undue burden from the state. On
Godbold's analysis, "[t]he intimate relationship between Shahar and her
partner whom she planned to marry did not involve marriage in a civil,
legal sense but it was inextricably entwined with Shahar's exercise of her
religious beliefs.'
2 45
Judge Kravitch, in contrast, does not parse this as a religious exercise
claim. She would view the Shahars' relationship as protected intimate
association even if they were not demonstrably religious within a clear
tradition. 46 I acknowledge what I take to be Judge Kravitch's concern
about overly focusing the right of intimate association on individuals who
participation in religious exercise. Nevertheless, in terms of themes of
constitution of identity through participation in performances whose
meaning is shared and understood by an interpretive community, it is clear
here that what the Shahars did to stabilize and solidify their commitment to
one another was to seek out a traditional status as a married couple, which
their faith, Reconstructionist Judaism, happened to make available to them
as a same-sex couple. The Shahars turned to both the civil vocabulary and
lexicon and the religious one. The religious community turned out to be
and Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at A26.
244. See, e.g., David Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 930-33 (2001) (arguing that
marriage is a unique expressive resource).
245. Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1224.
246. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1123 (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (recognizing Shahar's
relationship with her partner as a "protected intimate association under the First
Amendment" regardless of whether it was based in a religious tradition). This is not the
place to explore further what the constitutional freedom of intimate association might mean,
generally or for same-sex marriage in particular. The freedom was separately articulated,
though not applied, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). It has its roots
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and was given prominence in part through
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). Its
current contours are unclear. See generally Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of
Intimate Association in the Twenty-First Century, 16 GEo. MASON U. Civ. R. L. J. 269
(2006).
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more hospitable to their relationship than the civil one. But that is not
always the case, as our next example demonstrates.
B. Ocean Grove versus Ocean Grove
This section describes a current controversy in Ocean Grove, New
Jersey, over the location of same-sex civil union ceremonies. There is no
final outcome as yet, only a finding of probable cause in a state civil rights
247investigation by a state administrative agency, and an unreported federal
court decision dismissing a collateral attempt to enjoin the state civil rights
investigation.248
Ocean Grove was founded as a strict Methodist community in 1869,
under a corporate charter of the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting
Association. 249 By the mid-1990s, gay and lesbian couples were moving in,
247. Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of the United Methodist Church,
N.J. Dept. of L. & Pub. Safety, Div. on Civ. Rts., Docket No. PN34XB-03008 (2007)
[hereinafter Bernstein] (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/
newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bemstein-v-OGCMA.pdf. A second similar complaint
resulted in a finding of no probable cause. Moore v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of
the United Methodist Church, N.J. Dept. of L. & Pub. Safety, Div. on Civ. Rts., Docket No.
PN34XB-03012 (2007) [hereinafter Moore] (Dec. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr208l229a-Moore-v-OGCMA-NPC.pdf. A
footnote in Bernstein indicates that if the Camp Meeting Association were to reinstate
Pavilion rentals for weddings, Bernstein rather than Moore would apply. Bernstein, supra,
at 6 n.2. See generally Jill C. Capuzzo, Civil Union Dispute Pits Methodist Retreat Against
Gays Who Aided in its Rebirth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007, at B1 (providing background on
the Pavilion rental controversy).
248. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of the United Methodist Church v. Papaleo,
2007 WL 3349787 (D. N.J. Nov. 7, 2007).
249. Ocean Grove was founded in 1869, and was chartered by the state in 1870 at a
time when corporate charters were still issued by individual statute. The corporate charter
and bylaws require the Association to operate under strict Methodist principles, for the
purposes of producing a week-long revival style Camp Meeting each summer. See generally
ALAN J. KARCHER, NEW JERSEY'S MULTIPLE MUNICIPAL MADNESS (1998) (account of the
founding of many New Jersey municipalities, including Ocean Grove and neighboring
communities in Monmouth County); TROY MESSENGER, HOLY LEISURE: RECREATION AND
RELIGION IN GOD'S SQUARE MILE (1999) (providing a book-length history of Ocean Grove);
Glenn Uminowicz, Recreation in a Christian America: Ocean Grove and Asbury Park, New
Jersey, 1869-1914, in HARD AT PLAY: LEISURE IN AMERICA 1840-1940, at 8 (Kathryn
Grover ed., 1992) (providing a study of Ocean Grove in its heyday as a Methodist Camp
Meeting and seaside religious resort). The 1870 state charter granted the Association local
governmental powers, an arrangement eventually held unconstitutional as an establishment
of religion in 1979. State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1 (N.J.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979)
(holding Ocean Grove's form of government invalid on Establishment Clause grounds;
based on a challenge from someone convicted of a traffic misdemeanor); cf. Schaad v.
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and by the time the controversy arose, about one-fourth of the residents
were estimated to be same-sex couples.250
The gist of the conflict is simply stated. New Jersey enacted a civil
union statute in December 2006.251 Soon after this law became effective in
February 2007, two lesbian couples living in Ocean Grove, New Jersey,
sought to reserve a beachfront Pavilion in Ocean Grove for their civil union
ceremonies.252 Among its other uses, the Pavilion was traditionally rented
out for weddings during the summer season.253 The owner of the Pavilion,
the Camp Meeting Association, refused to rent the Pavilion to these
couples, on the grounds that the Camp Meeting Association was a
Methodist association, that the Pavilion was a religious structure, and that
the Methodist Book of Discipline prohibited the celebration of same-sex
unions in Methodist churches. 4
The couples filed complaints with the State's Division on Civil
Rights,2 5 arguing that the Pavilion was a public accommodation within the
meaning of the State's Law Against Discrimination (LAD), which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of affectional or sexual orientation and also civil
Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, 370 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1977), overruled in part by State v.
Celmer, 404 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1979) (holding that Ocean Grove's form of government did not
violate the Establishment Clause, but that prohibitions of sales of newspapers on the Sabbath
and of vehicular traffic on the Sabbath that had the effect of preventing delivery of the
Sunday New York Times violated state and federal constitutional guarantee of Freedom of
the Press). In Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1361-62 (N.J. 1992),
the state supreme court characterized the two Ocean Grove decisions as involving a religious
organization's enforcement of secular laws. Although the Borough of Neptune, whose
territory includes Ocean Grove, now exercises municipal authority over the municipality, the
land and many public buildings, including the Pavilion, continued to be owned by the
Association. KARCHER, NEW JERSEY'S MULTIPLE MUNICIPAL MADNESS 92 (1998).
250. KARCHER, supra note 249, at 91; Capuzzo, supra note 247, at B 1 (Ocean Grove
has seen the opening of a large number of gay-owned restaurants, hotels and shops for at
least the past decade); Tom Moran, Gays Only Welcome If they Know Their Place, THE
(NEWARK, N.J.) STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 7, 2007, at NJ 19 (gay and lesbians moved into Ocean
Grove in recent decades, bringing new businesses and fixing up houses); Nawal Qarooni,
Unfurling Their Rainbow: Lesbian Couple Holds Ceremony on a Pier after Use of Pavilion
is Barred, THE (NEWARK, N.J.) STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 17, 2007, at 13 (stating that Ocean
Grove is about 25 percent gay and lesbian).
251. 2006 N.J. Laws ch. 103.
252. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, of the United Methodist Church v. Papaleo
2007 WL 3349787 at *1 (D. N.J. Nov. 7, 2006).
253. Id.
254. See Bernstein, supra note 247; Moore, supra note 247; UNITED METHODIST BOOK
OF DISCIPLINE 1341.6 (2004 ed.).
255. See Bernstein, supra note 247; Moore, supra note 247.
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union status.256 The Camp Meeting Association then filed suit in federal
court seeking to enjoin the investigation as a violation of the free speech,
free exercise, and expressive association rights of the Association.257 The
federal district court declined to enjoin the investigation.
258
The parties filed unusually extensive briefs.259 Two opinions from the
state Division on Civil Rights were handed down on December 29, 2008.
The Division found probable cause of violation of the Law Against
Discrimination in the earlier of the two incidents of refusal to rent.260 The
second refusal to rent, although it occurred less than four weeks later, was
found not to demonstrate probable cause for violation of the state public
accommodations law, because the Camp Meeting Association had ceased
renting the Pavilion for any weddings whatsoever approximately two days
before the rental request. 261 The two opinions are preliminary findings of
probable cause under New Jersey law, where the standard is "a reasonable
ground for suspicion supported by facts and circumstances strong enough to
warrant a cautious person to believe that the law was violated and that the
matter should proceed to hearing., 262 The Ocean Grove controversy will
very likely go through a "contested case" administrative hearing before an
impartial administrative law judge, receive a final determination from the
agency, and then eventually be appealed into the state court system
pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-21.263
256. See id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-3, -4, -5(/) (describing New Jersey's legislative
findings in favor of an anti-discrimination policy and provide the substantive statute against
discrimination inter alia in public accommodations). Civil union status is addressed by 2006
N.J. Stat. Ch. 1083 § 88, and will eventually be incorporated into the code in various
locations.
257. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, 2007 WL 3349787 at *2.
258. Id. at *2-*6 (relying on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), as interpreted to
apply to civil rights administrative investigations in Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986), to allow the investigation to go forward).
259. Interview with Larry Lustberg, Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs (Sept. 5, 2008).
260. Bernstein, supra note 247, at 2. The Division also found that enforcement of the
Law Against Discrimination against the Camp Meeting Association would not violate the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
261. Moore, supra note 247. Several paragraphs finding facts related to the reversal of
the Pavilion rental policy are also found in Bernstein, supra note 247, at 5-6. Also,
respondents' counsel "described the decision to cease permitting use of the Pavilion for
weddings as an 'interim policy."' Id. at 5.
262. Bernstein, supra note 247, at 7 (citing Frank v. Ivy Club, 228 N.J. Super. 40, 56
(App Div. 1988), rev. on other grounds, 120 N.J. 73 (1990); Sprague v. Glassboro State
College, 161 N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 1978)).
263. Counsel for the Camp Meeting Association said that his clients would continue to
fight against being forced to allow civil unions on the property. See Lesbian Pair Wins
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Doctrinally, the outcome of the controversy may well turn on the
characterization of the beachfront Pavilion-whether, although privately
owned, it is a public accommodation subject to the LAD.264 The opinion in
Bernstein finds that "beginning at least as early as 2002, [the Camp Meeting
Association] permitted the public to reserve its Boardwalk pavilion for
exclusive use for events, mostly weddings and occasionally for other events
such as memorial services., 265  Moreover, when the Pavilion is not
reserved, it is open for general public use, "as a place to sit, congregate,
picnic, play and to seek shade and shelter from the weather." 266 Beginning
in 1989, the Camp Meeting Association also officially opened the Pavilion
to the public under a state "Green Acres" program that allows private
property owners to receive a tax exemption for doing this.267 These facts
formed the basis of the Division's determination at this stage that the
Pavilion was probably a public accommodation.268 If the Pavilion is
ultimately found to be a public accommodation, the Camp Meeting
Association may yet have available a statutory exemption of religious real
Ruling Over Refusal of Ceremony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, at A22 (stating position of
Brian Raum of the Alliance Defense Fund, counsel for the Camp Meeting Association);
Mary Ann Spoto, State Sides with Lesbian Couple in Fight Against Ocean Grove
Association, STAR-LEDGER (Newark., N.J.), Dec 30, 2008, at 11 (same).
264. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-3, -4, -5(/), -(f) (providing protection against
discrimination in public accommodations).
265. Bernstein, supra note 247. As to weddings, the Camp Meeting Association "did
not distinguish between religious or secular weddings, or between Christian weddings and
religious weddings of other faiths." Id. Moreover, the other secular events for which the
Pavilion would be reserved included "musical performances, university group meetings,
fundraising events for secular non-profit organizations, and a civil war reenactment." Id.
266. Id. at 4. The Camp Meeting Association sought property tax exemption under the
open space protection policy of the state Green Acres program rather than as a building used
for religious purpose, although that exemption might also have been available. Id. at 8 n.4.
267. Id. at 4-5. The most recent Green Acres tax exemption application was withdrawn
after the civil union controversy arose, and the state rescinded the then-applicable tax
exemption for the Pavilion (but not the boardwalk, which the Association also owns and
which it also dedicated as a park). Id. at 6; Jill P. Capuzzo, Group Loses Tax Break Over
Gay Union Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, sec. B, pt. 2. In addition, various public
funding programs for beach preservation and restoration also typically contained public
access conditions, which the Association as the owner of the property apparently agreed to.
Judy Peet & Mark Mueller, In Ocean Grove a Dignified Dispute over Civil Unions: Gay
Couple, Methodist Group at Odds in Legal Tangle, THE (NEWARK, N.J.) STAR-LEDGER, Aug.
16, 2007, at 17 (quoting United States Congressman Frank A. Pallone as saying that the
Camp Meeting Association had received state and federal money to help refurbish buildings
and maintain the beach); Interview with Larry Lustberg, Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs, (Sept. 5,
2008).
268. Bernstein, supra note 247, at 7-9.
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estate from the LAD.2 69  Also potentially available are the broader
constitutional claims around free speech, free exercise, and freedom of
association.27 °
For purposes of this article I do not wish to explore the doctrinal
details further or predict the outcome. The point here is that the two sides
in the Ocean Grove controversy are fighting over where same-sex union
ceremonies will take place, which is one aspect of the staging of the set of
identity performances that comprises the wedding. They fight because it
matters, in a larger set of cultural controversies, where civil union
ceremonies are allowed to be visible and recognized. New Jersey is one of
a minority of states that had legislated legal recognition of same-sex
couples (albeit not "marriage" and albeit in response to a state supreme
court decision).2 71
269. N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5-5(n) (stating, in its definition of real property, "[n]othing
herein contained shall be construed to bar any religious or denominational institution or
organization... from making such [admission] selection as is calculated by such
organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained").
In an unpublished decision on January 7, 2007, the Director of the Division on Civil Rights
concluded that this section was not applicable to public accommodations, but only to real
property rentals. See Bernstein, supra note 247, at 7 n.3 (referencing the January 7, 2007,
decision).
270. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656-57 (2000) (holding that in
some circumstances a constitutional right of expressive association could trump the
enforcement of a state antidiscrimination statute); Bernstein, supra note 247, at 9-12
(discussing and rejecting claims that freedom of expressive association or free exercise of
religion prevent enforcement of the Law Against Discrimination). The public uses of the
Pavilion formed an important factual basis for the Division's rejection of the Camp Meeting
Association's constitutional claims at this stage of the proceeding. With regard to Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(finding unanimously that organizers of a St. Patrick's Day parade had a free speech right
that would be compromised by enforcement of Massachusetts' public accommodations law
so as to require a GLB group to march under a banner), the facts in the Ocean Grove
controversy were found to be different. The Division found that:
[t]he Boardwalk Pavilion is not primarily used to convey a message .... [Tihe
Pavilion is put to a variety of uses, and they are not bound by the underlying
conveyance of a united message. All members of the public are invited to travel
through the pavilion, whether to rest, eat ice cream, engage in private
conversation or to pray.
Bernstein, supra note 247, at 10-11. Moreover, the Division found that the Pavilion "is not
a place that is inherently dedicated to religious worship," and that at the time the
complainants' application was made the Pavilion was not exclusively used for religious
practice. Id. at 11.
271. See 2006 N.J. Stat. ch. 103 (civil union law); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J.
2006) (requiring the state to grant equal benefits to committed same-sex couples either
through marriage on an equivalent legal status).
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But in Ocean Grove, the two plaintiff couples sought something more.
As long-term residents of Ocean Grove, they sought to be married in Ocean
Grove.272 Their visible civil union ceremony in a public place where they
lived would convey something about their claim to recognition as a couple
by the local community; and it would foster further visibility and
acceptance within that community. It would enact and entrench the
normalization conferred by the state's legal recognition of same-sex unions.
Moreover, the couples sought to appropriate the special local cultural
significance of the Pavilion, which the community understood was
regularly used for weddings. Even though the couples could not call their
civil unions legal marriages, celebrating their civil union ceremony in a
traditional place for weddings would bolster the legitimacy and normalcy of
the identity claim being performed and secured through the ceremony.
The Association's interest in preventing access to the Pavilion is
symmetrical, albeit opposed to, the couples' interest in obtaining access to
the Pavilion. The United Methodist Church opposes the recognition of
same-sex unions, even as it also expressly recognizes the dignity of
homosexual persons.273 It prohibits the use of its churches and places
within which to celebrate civil unions.274 New Jersey state law apparently
permits ministers to refuse to celebrate civil unions, according to their
faith,275 and probably does not require a religious denomination to use its
276churches for civil unions. One reason the current controversy in Ocean
272. As Harriet Bernstein, one of the plaintiffs, said, "We wanted to have it in Ocean
Grove because that's where we live[.]" Robert Schawneberg, Civil Union Law Has First
Test on Boardwalk, The (NEWARK, N.J.) STAR-LEDGER, June 21, 2007, at NJ 20. Randy
Bishop, a local government official in Neptune Township, of which Ocean Grove is a part,
contrasts the Pavilion with local churches, saying that the Pavilion is "part of the
community." Caren Chesler, Gays in a Methodist Town? No Problem (Until Now), N.Y.
TMEs, June 10, 2007, § 14NJ at 6 (quoting Mr. Bishop). The couples have since held civil
union ceremonies at other locations, at least one of them in Ocean Grove. Qarooni, supra
note 250, at 13.
273. See UNITED METHODIST BOOK OF DISCIPLINE 341.6 (2004 ed.) ("Ceremonies that
celebrate homosexual unions shall not be conducted by our ministers and shall not be
conducted in our churches.").
274. Id.
275. See Op. Att'y Gen. 1-2007, 2007 WL 749808 (N.J. 2007) (explaining that
ministers and similar religious leaders may exercise their power to celebrate marriages and
can choose not to celebrate civil unions, regardless of the requirements of New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination and of Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)). The opinion was
issued by Stuart Rabner, now Chief Justice of the State of New Jersey.
276. In the course of litigation over whether the addition of protection of sexual
orientation was constitutional, the state apparently conceded that churches would not be
forced to serve as the venues for such ceremonies. See Presbytery of New Jersey of
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Grove arose is because the past uses of the Pavilion make ambiguous
whether the structure is a church or falls somewhere on the secular and
public side of building uses. Be that as it may, the point here is that the
Methodist Church and the Camp Meeting Association, as a Methodist
organization, 77 seek to prevent a particular kind of identity performance
from occurring on or in a certain type of property that they own--churches
and other religious structures.2 78 They do so in furtherance of their version
of what constitutes proper performances of the identity of a married couple.
Essentially, they banish a particularly salient performance of identity from
the most visibly Methodist of public spaces. In so doing, they seek to
preserve or reclaim a principle of Methodism about the nature of marriage,
and thus about the nature of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. 79
The Ocean Grove controversy presents a curious and interesting
symmetry with the Shahar controversy.2z 0 In Shahar, the same-sex couple
sought recognition, and related rituals of identity, through a welcoming
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1461 (3d. Cir. 1994) (reproducing a
statement in an affidavit to the effect that the state would not attempt to force churches to act
contrary to sincerely held religious belief). The opinion in the case finds the controversy,
over whether the addition of "affectional or sexual preference" to the state Law Against
Discrimination, impermissibly burdened constitutional right to freedom of speech, ripe as to
clergymen acting outside their religious capacity, but not ripe as to churches. Id.
277. See Interview, supra note 259 (discussing that the Camp Meeting Association
concedes it is not a church, but rather a private corporation originally chartered to develop
land for the specific purpose of operating a Methodist Camp Meeting every summer).
278. Indeed, the attorney for the Camp Meeting Association said in response to
Bernstein that the Association would continue to resist allowing civil unions "on the
property." Lesbian Pair, supra note 263, at A22; Spoto, supra note 263. As reported, the
Association's position is now based on the Pavilion being private property of a devoutly
religious organization-not on the Pavilion being a church.
If the right to exclude is based purely on property ownership, a further possibility
of a vexing argument arises. Even after Celmer, the Camp Meeting Association still owns as
private property the entire square mile of Ocean Grove. It is all leased on 99-year leases.
One might ask whether the claim of a right to ban civil union ceremonies, made by the
Association here, can be extended to all of Ocean Grove. The Association is basically a
religious landlord on a grand scale.
279. The Camp Meeting Association's assertion of a right to exclude in order to protect
a traditional identity ritual is thus on all fours with the claim made successfully by the
organizers of the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). In Ocean Grove, the ritual is a
wedding-like ceremony, and the place was the Pavilion; in Hurley, the ritual was the parade,
and the place was the streets of Boston during the time annually set aside for the parade. See
generally Madhavi Sunder, Note, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The
Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REv. 143 (1996).
280. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (1 lth Cir. 1997) (en banc).
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religious community, of which they were longstanding participants. The
State of Georgia, which was hostile at that time to sodomy as well as to
other manifestations of homosexual visibility and claims to non-stigmatized
identity, controlled Robin Shahar's employment. Georgia punished Shahar
for engaging in visible misappropriations of married identity, by banishing
her from work as a lawyer for the State.28'
In the Ocean Grove controversy, same-sex couples seek social and
legal recognition and to that end wish to deploy rituals of identity provided
to them under civil law by the state of New Jersey. They seek, moreover, to
have these identity rituals performed in a place particularly meaningful to
them and to the community in which they live. Property law, however, in
the form of the right of an owner to exclude, delivers control of this place to
the Camp Meeting Association; unless, that is, the Pavilion is a public
accommodation or somehow otherwise has been made irrevocably public.
The Camp Meeting Association has relied on a basic property right and its
religious identity to exclude homosexual unions, in order to control and
reject the sought-after public identity performance. In this way, it signals to
a wider audience its adherence to a strict Methodist view of the lexicon of
couple performances, and thus of marriage, sex, gender, and sexual
orientation.282
The Shahar case and the Ocean Grove controversy involve more than
individuals or couples seeking recognition or seeking to express their true
selves. We must take account of the competing interpretive communities
within which and by which the couples' microperformances of identity as a
couple will be evaluated and interpreted. As Goffman pointed out, to
understand performances of the self, we also have to look to the
audience.283 There is more than one possible audience in these case studies.
One potential audience is local civil society, and another is a structured
281. Id.atll0l.
282. One can easily identify similar attempts to restrict LGBTQ visibility by other
traditionalist organizations. See, e.g., Poirier, Piecemeal, supra note 87, at 342-44
(discussing briefly how the Boy Scouts of America, the United States military, and the
Catholic Church seek to deploy decreased visibility to impair the logic of piecemeal change
through GLBT performance as functional citizens, couples, parents, and role models); see
also Schacter, supra note 55, at 369-70 (coerced invisibility is a response to increased
GLBT presence in public life).
283. See supra Part H.A (discussing Goffman). Another way of approaching the
issue-one itself rich with overtones of the problem of accommodating religious and civic
worldviews together-would be to turn to Robert Cover's concept of nomic communities.
Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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religious community. In each controversy, the audience communities
behave as would-be guardians of the lexicon, seeking to encourage or
prohibit certain identity performances, in furtherance of particular social
structures, so as to express and (re)produce particular views about sex,
gender, and sexual orientation.
C. Make Change, Not Lawsuits: Marriage Equality, "Conversations," and
the Lexicon
Our final case study again reveals an attempt to control performances
by same-sex couples in order to affect the lexicon. This time the agents
seeking to control performance are national LGBT advocacy groups. In
May 2008, the California Supreme Court held that California was required
to allow same-sex couples to marry under the State constitution as a matter
of both equal protection and privacy analyses.284 The decision is
remarkable and important in many ways. It made marriage widely
available to same-sex couples in the United States for the first time;
California, in contrast to Massachusetts at that time, had no residency
requirement for couples seeking to be married there.285
The California decision, In re Marriage Cases, generated Make
Change, Not Lawsuits.286 Make Change was a communication by the nine
most important United States GLBT advocacy organizations to their
collective base.287 It is a broad attempt to influence the behavior of same-
284. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
285. At the time of the California decision, marriage was of course already available to
same-sex couples in Canada and a few countries in Europe and Africa. Massachusetts had
opened marriage to same-sex couples in 2004, but only for Massachusetts residents and
residents of those few states that did not prohibit marriage between same-sex couples. See
Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006) (upholding the
applicability of Massachusetts' marriage evasion act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 11-12
(2008)); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
Massachusetts must allow same-sex couples to marry, effective 180 days after the date of the
decision); see also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 2004)
(clarifying that the Goodridge mandate would not be satisfied by a civil union law). The
Massachusetts marriage evasion statute was repealed in July, 2008. Mass. St. 2008 ch. 216 §
1.
286. Make Change, supra note 16 (offering advice to same-sex couples who might
marry in California and then seek to enforce their California marriage against the federal
government or in other states).
287. The advocacy organizations listed in Make Change include the American Civil
Liberties Union, GLAD, Lambda Legal, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the Equality
Federation, Freedom to Marry, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, the
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sex couples in the wake of the California decision. One purpose of Make
Change is to stress that same-sex couples who get married in California
should not then sue the federal government or, if they live elsewhere than
California or another welcoming state, their home states and their
employers, to force legal recognition of their marriages. Make Change
explains in layperson's terms why these lawsuit strategies are likely to be
harmful to the goal of nationwide marriage equality. They would produce
losses and would entrench further legal positions hostile to marriage
equality. 288 Make Change serves to educate same-sex couples and their
allies about the realities of a legal civil rights strategy that has been
carefully calibrated to avoid making bad law in unsympathetic jurisdictions
and to shift public perception, bit by bit, in a favorable direction.289
What does Make Change encourage same-sex couples to do instead?
The opening paragraph exhorts, "[i]f you're ready and it's right for you, get
married in California. If you do, claim the name and act like what you
are-married. ''290 The document continues:
Couples who want to should get married, call themselves married, and
ask (sometimes demand) that family, friends, neighbors, businesses,
employers and the community treat their marriages with respect.
Making the marriages of same-sex couples a conscious part of American
society will help us get something we'll need to win ultimately: public
acceptance of lesbian and gay families.
291
This is an identity performance strategy. It applies in both the
registers that Goffman identified: the "direct" verbal claiming of the status
and identity of married couple, and the "indirect" nonverbal performances
of identity and status of a married couple.292 The idea is further explained:
Changing the law through Court decisions based on fundamental
principles of fairness and equality helps persuade people that change is
the right thing. But the most powerful agent of change in America is
people.
Human Rights Campaign, and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. Id.
288. See id. at 3 (explaining that losing court cases will hurt the gay marriage cause by
causing more delay and by hurting gay people on other constitutional issues like
employment, adoption, and custody).
289. See id. ("Right now, we need to make gains in both public opinion and state law.").
290. Id. at 1.
291. Id.
292. See GOFFMAN, PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 6, at 2 (discussing a distinction
between direct and indirect modes of performances of the self in everyday life).
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Nothing moves America more on LGBT rights in general and marriage
in particular more effectively than conversations that all LGBT people
can have with our friends and family members about how it feels to be
treated differently and why that is so unfair ....
We'll win marriage because individual couples get married, tell their
family, friends, co-workers, and community that they are married, and
talk in very practical terms about why it is so important. And about
what it means to be same-sex and married, with all the fundamental
freedoms that others have.
Simply getting married and telling people will spark these
conversations.29 3
Same-sex married couples are also encouraged to ask for the benefits
of marriage from their employers and town, though without suing for those
benefits willy-nilly. 294 "But maybe more important, [these requests will]
spark the conversations we need to make the changes in law enduring and
real at the day-to-day level.
' 295
This "conversations" strategy finds an echo in the majority opinion in
296Lewis v. Harris. The court there declined to require the legislature to
change the definition of marriage, leaving that decision up to a "democratic
process.297 But in the processes that will lead to identifying the "proper
labels,, 298 the court expects that the legislature will be guided by a diffuse
and evolving social practice that includes same-sex couples calling
themselves married couples rather than civil union partners, and also same-
sex couples securing religiously-recognized marriages.
New language is developing to describe new social and familial
relationships, and in time will find its place in our common vocabulary.
Through a better understanding of those new relationships and
acceptance forged in the democratic process, rather than by judicial fiat,
the proper labels will take hold. However the Legislature may act,
same-sex couples will be free to call their relationships by the name they
choose and to sanctify their relationships in religious ceremonies in
houses of worship.
299
293. Make Change, supra note 16, at 5.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006).
297. Id. at 223.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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I will offer two points here about Make Change, and one further point
in the concluding section of this article. First, although the document
attempts to steer same-sex couples in the direction of conversations and
visible performances of married couples, it does not provide any details of
the script. It need not do so. Everyone already understands what it means
to be married, on a variety of levels. The status and identity of marriage
have personal meaning to the couple themselves, to their close relatives and
friends, to their casual neighbors, to those with whom they have brief
"service interactions" (to use a term from Goffman).3°
That is not to say that there is no variation in various United States
populations about what it means to be married or how that is manifested in
microperformances. But the claim made by same-sex couples and their
allies relies crucially on the fact that those involved in dialogic identity
performance interactions already understand what "marriage" in general
means in our society. The claim is that we should apply this understanding
in practice equally to same-sex couples. Everyone-all same-sex couples
and their allies-already knows what to do in these "conversations" if they
are willing to be visible and verbal and to risk embarrassment, humiliation,
and rejection.30 1  It is not unlike the kind of pervasive, impolite and
potentially effective behavior that Goffman noted with admiration in the
Quakers.3°2
The already-known quality of what marriage is about is central to an
accurate description of the stakes in the same-sex marriage/marriage
equality controversy. And that is what will be claimed, and be understood
to be claimed, in the microperformances that Make Change encourages.
Andrew Sullivan provides a telling description in a recent essay entitled My
Big Fat Straight Wedding.3 °3 It provides an anecdotal account of how the
microperformances involved in a same-sex wedding have larger effects on
the participants, family, and friends, and result in immediate recognition,
acceptance, and legitimacy. I quote at some length.
It happened first when we told our families and friends of our intentions.
Suddenly, they had a vocabulary to describe and understand our
relationship. I was no longer my partner's "friend" or "boyfriend"; I was
300. GOFFMAN, PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 6, at xi.
301. See Make Change, supra note 16, at 5 (discussing the importance of talking with
friends and family about "how it feels to be treated differently and why that is so unfair").
302. See Goffman, The Interaction Order, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing the Quakers'
"wonderfully disruptive power of systematic impoliteness").
303. Andrew Sullivan, My Big Fat Straight Wedding, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 2008, at 17.
I am indebted to colleague Sarah Waldeck for calling this essay to my attention.
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his fianc6. Suddenly, everyone involved themselves in our love. They
asked how I had proposed; they inquired when the wedding would be;
my straight friends made jokes about marriage that simply included me
as one of them. At that first post-engagement Christmas with my in-
laws, I felt something shift. They had always been welcoming and
supportive. But now I was family. I felt an end-a sudden, fateful
end-to an emotional displacement I had experienced since childhood.
The wedding occurred last August in Massachusetts in front of a small
group of family and close friends. And in that group, I suddenly
realized, it was the heterosexuals who knew what to do, who guided that
gay couple and our friends into the rituals and rites of family. Ours was
not, we realized, a different institution, after all, and we were not
different kinds of people. In the doing of it, it was the same as my
sister's wedding and we were the same as my sister and brother-in-law.
The strange, bewildering emotions of the moment, the cake and
reception, the distracted children and weeping mothers, the morning's
butterflies and the night's drunkenness: this was not a gay marriage; it
was a marriage.
And our families instantly and for the first time since our early
childhood became not just institutions in which we were included, but
institution that we too owned and perpetuated. My sister spoke of her
marriage as if it were interchangeable with my own, and my niece and
nephew had no qualms in referring to my husband as their new uncle.
The embossed invitations and the floral bouquets and the fear of fluffing
our vows: in these tiny, bonding gestures of integration, we all came to
see an alienating distinction become a unifying difference.
30
An editor might suggest summarizing this passage. But it is precisely
a string of details, microperformances, associations, and consequent
recognitions and reaffirmations, all described in Sullivan's writing--details
the understanding of which is in fact shared widely-that are the raw
materials which create and recreate the identity of being a married couple. I
cannot cut this down.
The "conversations" exhorted by Make Change entail identity work by
all the individuals involved in recognizing identity performances regarding
same-sex marriage. Make Change asks same-sex married couples to
initiate this work, but it is of course also imposed on the couples' various
audiences. Many who encounter microperformances and verbal claims by
same-sex married couples will experience traditional trait associations,
consciously or unconsciously-i.e. that marriage is between people of
opposite sexl, who behave in masculine and feminine ways sorted by sexl,
304. Id. at 18.
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and who have heterosexual desires and heterosexual sex2.3°5 Such people
will experience the transparency of their conscious or unconscious
associations challenged by the performances being made by same-sex
couples.306  At the very least, such conversations will force folks to
undertake an examination of what they assumed was natural about couples
and marriage. To be sure, if Make Change were written explicitly in this
kind of theoretical language, it would be much less effective than written as
it is, in terms of getting married, acting married, and having perfectly
normal if potentially somewhat awkward "conversations" about marriage.
But that is how this strategy operates.
A second point is that the joint authors of Make Change have got it
wrong in terms of the ordering of the process. Most of the document
describes legal strategy.3 °7 Its authors seem to give the law primacy in
terms of achieving social change around marriage equality: "There are two
things we need to do to win the freedom to marry nationwide. First, we
need to change the law .... The second thing we need to do... is to
convince America to accept the change, to accept the idea that our
constitution does not allow discrimination." 308  Make Change makes
conversations second, coming after the law has been changed. This might
be a deliberate overemphasis on formal litigation and legislation, or
evidence of a professional deformation that sees law, rather than culture, as
the primary arena of cultural struggle.3° In any event, the joint authors
appear to believe that legal change comes first. It doesn't.
305. Heteronormativity is linked to the normativity of reproduction. See, e.g.,
Katherine Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 181, 183-97 (2001) (arguing that feminism has inadequately theorized expectations of
reproduction, i.e., repronormativity, and calling for further theorization of female sexuality
outside of reproduction); Jos6 Gabilondo, Irrational Exuberance about Babies: The Taste
for Heterosexuality and Its Conspicuous Reproduction, 28 B.C. TIRD WORLD J. 1, 11-34
(2008) (describing parental taste both for heterosexuality and for offspring who reproduce,
and showing how this taste is reflected in some of the marriage equality opinions).
306. Cf Flagg, supra note 65 (discussing transparently white subjective decision
making).
307. See, e.g., Make Change, supra note 16, at 4 ("In some states, we'll get marriage
through the state legislature, to show that it has popular support. In other states, we'll go to
the courts, to show that excluding same-sex couples is inconsistent with basic principles of
fair play.").
308. Id. at 4-5.
309. See generally Gusfield, supra note 98 (distinguishing more formal, goal oriented
aspects of new social movements and more fluid, individual-reinterpreting aspects of social
movements).
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Courts respond to social change,31° though the relationship between
social change and legal change is complex and the process cannot easily be
generalized.31' Jay Michaelson has argued that culture, not the courts,
effectively overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.312 Andrew Sullivan writes, with
regard to the California marriage decision, "What the California court
did... was not to recognize a new right to same-sex marriage. It was to
acknowledge an emergent cultural consensus. 3 13 The shifting social or
cultural consensus is often eventually expressed in general and abstract
terms, formalized in legal recognition. That stabilizes the new emerging
consensus at the expense of the old one. Through performances of
visibility without shame, gay men and lesbians can eventually become
accepted formally as equals, through legalized access to marriage. But the
transformation occurs first and always at the level of individuals'
experiences and the identity performances of basic level categories,
including the kinship categories addressed by the status of marriage. As
Sullivan writes, "[i]t was a moment that shifted a sense of our own
identities within our psyches and even our souls. Once this happens, the law
eventually follows.
3 14
The LGBT advocacy groups who authored Make Change, and who
have steered the marriage equality movement for a decade or more now, are
hardly throwing open the doors to whatever plan for legitimization of same-
sex relationships anyone can come up with. It is not a liberty strategy for
same-sex couples, at least in the short run. Theirs is an attempt to steer the
microperformances of identity by same-sex couples. As Janet Halley
310. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social
Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1955, 1955 (2006) (noting that
courts respond to social change); id. at 1961 (noting that courts are "inescapably involved in
absorbing, evaluating, and influencing changes to popular judgments regarding social
groups").
311. See Jane S. Schacter, Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts, 54
DRAKE L. REv. 861, 864 (2006) (explaining that, given the number and variety of individuals
and groups upon whom a decision generates social change, it is very difficult to generalize
about court decisions as a vehicle for social change).
312. See Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf, or, How America Overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn't, 49 DuKE L.J. 1559, 1562 (2000)
(noting that in matters such as these law may often follow society rather than leading it). See
generally Susan J. Becker, Many Are Chilled, but Few are Frozen: How Transformative
Learning in Popular Culture, Christianity, and Science Will Lead to the Eventual Demise of
Legally Sanctioned Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the United States, 14 AM.
U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL. & L. 177 (2006).
313. Sullivan, supra note 303, at 18.
314. Id.
15 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2008)
wrote, a decade ago, "if advocacy constructs identity, if it generates a script
that identity bearers must heed, and if that script restricts group members,
then identity politics compels its beneficiaries. Identity politics suddenly is
no longer mere or simple resistance: it begins to look like power. ' 315 In
identity politics, advocates for change do not simply seek material change;
they also "manage the discursive rendering of the group. 3 6 And this may
sometimes involve seeking to curb "race-to-the-courthouse individualism.
'" 317
Make Change, Not Lawsuits is a contemporary example of how those
at the head of identity-based social movements will sooner or later attempt
to steer not only focused legal efforts aimed at achieving specific goals, but
also the social processes that underlie and facilitate those more concrete
goals. The conversation approach grows apace. As this article was going
to press, the author received an email from the director of the American
Civil Liberty Union's LGBT and AIDS Project, announcing a similar
conversation project directed not just at marriage equality but at making the
family and friends of LGBT folk more familiar with and sympathetic to the
experience of being gay or lesbian, by encouraging gay and lesbian
individuals to have conversations with three friends about what it is like to
be lesbian or gay.318 This new "Tell3" project is a considered response to
the defeat of marriage equality at the polls in California in Proposition 8.319
It is anchored by a website describing how to undertake such conversations,
but not prescribing their content in detail.32° Other LGBT advocacy
organizations are undertaking similar conversation projects.321
Any attempt by the leaders of organized LGBT advocacy groups to
control diffuse social interactions in the interest of the movement is likely
to be experienced by some who are affected by and participate in the
315. Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 115, 117 (David Kairys
ed., 3d ed. 1998) (discussing K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, -Authenticity, Survival:
Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM: ExAMINING THE
POLrIcs OF RECOGNMON 149 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994)).
316. Id. at 120.
317. Id. at 127. Writing ten years ago, Halley specifically had in mind the problem of
"decisions to sue to obtain marriage licenses even though [the] cases would likely produce
bad law because of bad timing or bad venue." Id. at 129.
318. Email, Matt Coles, February 26, 2009 (on file with author).
319. Id.
320. Tell3 Homepage, http://tell-three.org (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
321. So says Mr. Coles. Coles, supra note 318. See also IAN AYRES & JENNIFER
GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: How TO MOBILIZE HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY
RIGHTS (2005) (outlining a similar conversation strategy).
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identity-resignifying aspect of the movement as an imposition or constraint,
inimical to the freedom that they understood the movement to be about.
Judith Butler criticizes the professionalization of gayness, and although her
critique is aimed at an academic professionalization, it will do for political
movement-based professionalization as well. "The professionalization of
gayness requires a certain performance and production of a 'self which is
the constituted effect of a discourse that nevertheless claims to 'represent'
that self as a prior truth."322 The Make Change document exposes the social
construction of identity being engineered by the professional LGBT
movement in the latter half of 2008, as the professional movement purports
to represent its constituents' interests by telling them how to behave in daily
interactions, based on what the constituents already supposedly are and
know that they are, all as a way of shifting social and legal norms.
323
Make Change is a clear product of what Gusfield calls the "reflexivity
of social movements. 324 Gusfield posits a dichotomy between structured
aspects of social movements, with clear organizational goals, and diffuse
and fluid aspects of social movements, reflected in the potential for opening
up or shifting individual understandings of the meaning of identities and
events.325 The two types of effects-shifts in the meaning of individual
identity (including shifts in the interpretation of microinteractions), and the
achievement of specified identifiable goals-are mutually reinforcing, in a
kind of feedback loop (my word)32 6 or reflexivity (Gusfield's term).
32 7
Make Change is generated by a group of structured movement associations
322. Butler, Imitation, supra note 1, at 18.
323. Just to be clear, this statement is not necessarily a critique of the GLBT
organizations for some sinister manipulation or failure to represent movement members as to
what they might want, independent of the movement. Once one goes down the social
constructionist path for understanding identity and identity-based social movements, one
must abandon the dream that the "correct" way to approach a social movement is to allow it
to occur spontaneously and naturally. The processes that create and recreate identity, from
which identity-based social movements emerge, are ever-present and ever-political.
Identity-based social movements always shape their adherents to one degree or another. See,
e.g., Gusfield, supra note 98, at 70 (describing the way in which individuals will reinterpret
their daily lives in light of social movements, regardless of whether the individuals are even
actively involved in the movement). At the same time, as Nancy Fraser observes of
subaltern counterpublics, the political structures that seek to shape social movements may
well, in the event, be antidemocratic, antiegalitarian, or more subtly marginalizing and
exclusionary. Fraser, supra note 229, at 124.
324. Gusfield, supra note 98, at 68.
325. Id. at 64-66 (contrasting older and new social movements).
326. See supra Part I.
327. The title of Gusfield's essay adverts to the "reflexivity" of the new social
movements. Gusfield, supra note 98, at 58.
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and the individuals who command them, in order to corral the diffuse, fluid,
meaning-focused aspects of the marriage equality movement, in the service
of achieving specific law-related goals.
Traditionalists on the one hand, and the mainstream LGBT groups on
the other, are not the only ones seeking to manage the movement's version
of identity and its politics. We must not overlook the longstanding critiques
of the marriage equality movement from the feminist left and from the
queer left. As to the left feminist critique of marriage equality, a germinal
essay by Paula Ettelbrick is entitled Since When is Marriage a Path to
Liberation ?328 Nancy Polikoff recently wrote a book length argument about
the threat of marriage to alternative families.329  Ruthann Robson goes
further, challenging even the family as a legitimating structure because of
its exclusion of lesbians. 330 For her part, Katherine Franke laments the shift
of the rights bearing subject of the lesbigay rights movement from the
individual to the couple. 331 Franke suggests that the desire for recognition
by LGBT folks has turned to legal and state authority to remedy a harm
332
understood to be caused by non-recognition. The kind of recognition
being sought relies on a form of normative kinship but also, and more
importantly, on the state. 333 "We seek to be understood within a community
of the governed on terms equal to others in that political community, 334 and
we seek a particular form of address, kinship. 335 This kind of recognition
"presupposes the internalization of a set of norms of self-governance-self-
governance within the couple and governance of the couple by the state.
3 36
328. Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, reprinted in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PRO & CON: A READER 122 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 2004).
329. NANcY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008). In an earlier influential essay, Polikoff wrote, "[An effort
to legalize lesbian and gay marriage would make a public critique of the institution of
marriage impossible." Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing
Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every
Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (1993) [hereinafter We Will Get What We Ask For]
(taking issue with Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW
& SExuALrrY 9, 18-19 (1991) (quoted in the title of Polikoff's essay)).
330. Ruthann Robson, Resisting the Family: Repositioning Lesbians in Legal Theory,
19 SIGNS 975 (1994).
331. See Franke, supra note 5, at 239.
332. Id. at 240-41.
333. Id. at 245.
334. Id. at 246.




Franke argues that this move towards recognition of the couple as normal
has resulted in a loss of political interest in other forms of sociability.337
Michael Warner's The Trouble with Normal is a paradigmatic text
for the queer critique of marriage equality.3 38  In a chapter entitled
"Beyond Gay Marriage," 339 he takes the marriage equality movement to
task, in the process excoriating many of its leaders. Special attention is
reserved for Andrew Sullivan, after whose book Virtually Normal
Warner's volume in part takes its title.3 4° Warner sets his critique in a
broader theoretical background 341 in which he discusses sex, shame, and
342stigma. He argues that while sexual activity will always be
accompanied by shame,34 3 it is also as a descriptive matter typically
accompanied by stigma, which marks certain types of sexual activities
as normal and others as dishonorable. 344 The gay movement always has
to cope with both shame and stigma, but the two are often confused.3 45
The LGBT movement is about achieving dignity,346 but dignity can be
accomplished in one of two diametrically opposite ways-by moving
toward a recognition that different ways of being sexual should be
accorded equal dignity, or by using the pre-existing paradigm of normal
and stigmatized to manage homosexuality.347 Of this latter concept
Warner writes that we might as well call it bourgeois propriety.348
Warner also explicitly draws on Goffman's work on stigma, including
337. Id.
338. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS
OF QUEER LIFE 7 (1999).
339. Id. at 81-147.
340. ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL (1995). Warner addresses Sullivan's
book and other key books and essays by Sullivan at numerous points in The Trouble with
Nonnal. WARNER, supra note 338, at 52-54, 60-61, 92, 112-13, 134-41,145-46.
341. Warner writes that his book "rises from the abstract to the concrete." Id. at vii.
342. Id. at 1-40 (chapter entitled "The Ethics of Sexual Shame").
343. Id. at 3.
344. Id. at 27-28. Warner includes here various kinds of sexual difference-his
argument is not just limited to homosexuality. See id. at 37 (mentioning gender identity
issues such as nellie men and butch women, and different sexual practices such as
prostitution, leather, anal play, sex toys, sadomasochism, and sex in public places).
345. Id. at 28.
346. See id. at 37 ("The lesbian and gay movement at its best has always been rooted in
a queer ethic of dignity.").
347. Id. at 36 (presenting a view of two kinds of dignity, one a dignity that is
hierarchical and "requires soap," the other fundamentally democratic).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 27-28 (discussing GOFFMAN, STIGMA, supra note 6).
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a dichotomy Goffman posits between those who embrace stigmatized
identity (stigmaphiles) and those who, although themselves stigmatized,
seek to escape stigma (stigmaphobes) ° Warner observes that "The
stigmaphobe world is the dominant culture, where conformity is ensured
through fear of stigma. 351 And, he writes, loathing of queer sexuality
defines the leaders of the gay movement. "Those with the biggest fig
leaf stand, as always, at the top of the hierarchy. 3 52 There is a hierarchy
of sexual shame,353 and political leaders driven by fear of stigma exploit
and reproduce it. 354 At the same time, they claim to represent those of
whom they are so ashamed.355
Warner's critique of the current marriage equality movement unfolds
from these broad premises. Thematically, the marriage equality movement
systematically seeks to gain normal status by continuing to stigmatize those
whose sexual tastes and acts cannot be made to conform to the idealized
model of marriage.356 Whereas the early gay and lesbian movement was
characterized by brave and sometimes insurrectionary acts of stigmaphiles,
the movement has shifted now to stigmaphobe politics. 357 This realignment
began in the early 1990s. 358 The marriage equality movement is part of
it;359 it thrives on an "amnesia" of the earlier stigmaphile approach.360 It is
"not so much a campaign for marriage as a campaign about the constituency
and vocabulary of the gay and lesbian public. 3 61 Warner links the marriage
350. Id. at 43.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 40. At another point he writes, "Political groups that mediate between
queers and normals find that power lies almost exclusively on the normal side." Id. at 44.
353. Id. at 24-27 (discussing Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of
the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267
(Carole S. Vance ed., 1984)).
354. ld. at 31-32 (the official gay movement fails to target the politics of shame and
instead blames queer sexuality as a way of addressing stigma); id. at 49 (gay and lesbian
politics is built on embarrassment and tends to reproduce the hierarchy of shame).
355. ld. at 44.
356. See, e.g., id. at 113 (summarizing Andrew Sullivan's argument as "marriage...
would make for good gays-the kind who would not challenge the norms of straight culture,
who would not flaunt sexuality, and who would not insist on living differently from ordinary
folk").
357. Id. at 75.
358. Id. at 76-77.
359. Id. at 87 ("Marriage became the dominant issue in lesbian and gay politics in the
1990s, but not before."); id. at 145-46 (same).
360. Id. at 137.
361. id. at 143.
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equality movement to a long history of concern by "proper" lesbian and gay
leaders over how to manage the appearances in public of less reputable
parts of the community362-which of course amounts to a claim of a right to
define membership in the community. Warner thus depicts the current
marriage equality movement as an attempt to exercise power from above
and to exclude inappropriate behavior and claims. In Warner's view, a less
centralized and more democratic approach would allow creative alternatives
for relationships to develop, fostering a wider array of alternatives that
would be better for all.363 And it might allow some of the other issues
obscured by marriage equality to reemerge. 364 Pushing for same-sex
marriage "represents a widespread loss of vision in the movement. ' 365 It is
also "profoundly antidemocratic. ''366
I have identified for separate discussion here the queer critique of
marriage equality, even though it intersects at many points with the feminist
critique of marriage equality. The difference seems to me to be often a
question of background concerns and of emphasis. The feminist critique
looks to the constraints that a focus on access to traditional marriage
imposes on other more liberating relationships and on each individual's
freedom to define her/his relationships in new ways. The feminist critique
does not especially focus on sexual activity as such.367 The queer critique
looks to underlying issues of sexual behavior, shame, and stigma, and is
concerned with the undermining of what was at one point in time a focus of
the gay movement on a freedom to engage in sexual activity in various
ways that were stigmatized and that certainly did not resemble monogamy
within marriage. 368 The feminist and queer critiques converge on certain
important issues. They disapprove of giving marriage equality primacy to
362. See, e.g., id. at 45-46, 50 (providing examples from the history of the gay and
lesbian movement of scandals over stigmatized sexuality).
363. Id. at 85 (describing alternatives to marriage that have been obscured by the
marriage equality movement).
364. See id. at 84 (listing issues obscured by the emergency of marriage equality).
365. Id. at vii. Warner also points out that an earlier phase of the movement understood
marriage equality to be part of a broader array of issues. Id. at 90. He suggests that the
marriage movement could be reconceptualized in this fashion. Id. at 146.
366. Id. at 112.
367. An early, notable exception within the feminist approach is Rubin, who seeks to
introduce a sex-positive approach into the feminist platform. See generally Gayle Rubin,
Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND
DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984)).
368. Michael Warner for example suggests that the goal should be "sexual autonomy,
consistent with everyone else's sexual autonomy...." WARNER, supra note 338, at 7.
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the detriment of other issues they see as equally important or more
important. They criticize the politics of leadership of the marriage equality
movement, beginning in the mid-1990s, when marriage equality was put
forward as a central issue. And both approaches address what they view as
an unjustified intrusiveness of the state into assigning status only to a
certain type of relationship-marriage-and consequently privileging the
mode of idealized sexuality attributed to marriage. They consider that the
marriage equality movement errs in its reliance on the state to confer
normal status, to be achieved through marriage. They posit a more diverse
and democratic vision of sex and of relationships.
Both the feminist critique and the queer critique have the description
of the turn to recognition through marriage exactly correct, correct in terms
of an assessment of the current state of same-sex marriage politics and of
the underlying mechanism of recognition. 369 As Judith Butler writes, "[o]ne
may wish for another lexicon altogether. 370 I am not sure, however, that
anything else is possible, certainly not all at once.37 1 Any attempt to move
gay and lesbian identity and relationships from stigmatized to normal will
include expressing the yearning for assimilation into the normal by
strategizing around achieving access to the already-known normal status,
which is the married couple. We currently have no other widely shared and
deeply embedded language in which to express it.
372
369. I would note that, from a very different point on the political spectrum, Mae
Kuykendall makes a similar assessment about the link of traditional marriage to the political
order. See Kuykendall, supra note 226, at 102 ("[T]here may yet be some cultural force to
the claim that traditional marriage is a central re-enactment of the premises of consent to the
political order."). Kuykendall further states that "the inclusion of same-sex marriage in the
reenactment confirms that the undertaking to create everyday affirmations of consent to the
political order, and the quest for engagement, is a common undertaking."
370. JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 107 (1994).
371. In a personal communication Mae Kuykendall terms the alternative aspiration of
Franke and similar feminist critics of marriage equality "utopian." Email, Mae Kuykendall
to Marc Poirier, Jan. 21, 2009 (on file with author).
372. See generally Kuykendall, supra note 227 (describing the marriage controversy in
terms of giving priority to a living language that evolves over rigidifying archaic linguistic
forms).
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IV. Some Further Observations
A. The Same-Sex Marriage Controversy Is About More than Covering, It Is
About Claiming and Transforming Identity
At several points in Covering (the article) and COVERING (the book),
Yoshino argues that the same-sex marriage controversy is an issue of
covering.373 "The right of gays to marry is a question of covering, as it
pertains not to the ability of gays to be gay or to self-identify as gay, but to
their ability to signal that identity beyond the simple act of self-
identification. 3 74 Later in the article, Yoshino provides a list of behaviors
that constitute either gay covering or gay flaunting. 375 He finds same-sex
marriage to be on the covering side of some of these binaries and the
flaunting side of others.376 In COVERING (the book), Yoshino explains in
his view same-sex marriage is both flaunting and covering.
Along the axis of affiliation, marriage is an act of covering, as marriage
has historically been associated with straight culture. This is why
queer.. . revile it and normals... endorse it as an act of assimilation.
Along the axes of appearance, activism, or association, however,
marriage is an act of flaunting. This is why right-wing moralists object
to it as a sign that gays are getting too strident in our claims for
equality.377
Yoshino also describes Shahar v. Bowers378 as about a failure to cover:
in the eyes of the Attorney General the couple had flaunted their
homosexuality. 379 True enough, but this is not a full account of the issue.
The plaintiff said she did not intend to "transform" her intimate relationship
373. See, e.g., COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 19 ("[T]he contemporary
resistance to gay marriage can be understood as a covering demand; Fine, be gay, but don't
shove it in our faces.").
374. Yoshino, Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 776.
375. Id. at 842-48. Behaviors listed include abstention from sodomy vs. engagement in
sodomy; private displays of same-sex affection vs. public displays; straight-culture focused
vs. gay-culture focused; nonactivist vs. activist; prioritizing other identities vs. prioritizing
gay identity; allied with straights vs. allied with other gays; allied with mainstream vs. allied
with other "deviants"; monogamous vs. promiscuous; single or secretly coupled vs. openly
coupled.
376. See id. at 848-49 (locating marriage on the covering side of some binaries and the
signaling side of others).
377. COVERING, (the book), supra note 10, at 91.
378. 114 F.3d 1097 (1lth Cir. 1997) (en banc).
379. See COVERING (the book), supra note 10, at 97.
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into a public statement. 380 Nevertheless, the majority found that she had
done enough to "transform" it into a public statement, one sufficient to
warrant the Attorney General's concern.38' This dispute over the
interpretation of microperformances, in order to control their transformative
potential, is a central part of the controversy over same-sex couples and
same-sex marriage. It can seem a bit slighted in Yoshino's accounts, unless
we understand covering to also be about a possibility for transformation
through transgressive performance.381 And COVERING (the book) falls
especially short here, when it invokes the quest for authenticity. The goal
then comes to be allowing individuals who so choose to uncover their
authentic gay selves, rather than to facilitate transforming the lexicon for
themselves and others.
Andrew Sullivan's testimony suggests that the power of wedding and
marriage to transform both subjective self-understanding and identity
shared with others is quite real. Sullivan went through a "real" wedding,
participating in a traditional set of rituals from top to bottom.383 His
wedding was not a matter of pre-existing selves that "came out" but of a
participation in a recognizable and (newly in Massachusetts) available
particular kind of interaction ritual, in which the self could be performed
and made real for all in a different way.384 His wedding and marriage
enabled everyone concerned, from him and his husband, to the relatives, to
380. Shahar, 114 F.3d. at 1106 (quoting Robin Shahar).
381. Id. at 1107.
382. In Covering (the article), Yoshino does acknowledge that some kinds of covering
activities are self-constituting. See supra note 9, at 870-73. This part of the article develops
two models of identity: a strong performative model, based on JUDITH BUTLER: GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (2d ed. 1999), and a weak
performative model, based on JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE
Limrrs OF "SEX" (1993). But this passage is undeveloped, and not connected to his
arguments about marriage.
383. Sullivan is Catholic, or was Catholic last time I checked. He surely did not have a
Catholic same-sex wedding. It was a small, traditional civil wedding. Sullivan, supra note
303.
384. See Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19271 (Sept. 21, 2006) (discussing the differences
between civil unions and marriage). As Ronald Dworkin writes:
Civil union status... does not provide the social and personal meaning of
[marriage] because marriage has a spiritual dimension that civil union does not.
For many people, this is a religious dimension, which some same-sex couples
want as much as some heterosexuals do. For others it is the participation in the
historical and cultural traditions that both kinds of couples covet.
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the friends, and maybe even to the caterer, to recognize him differently.
385
It transformed them as well. Just these kinds of transformations-
experienced, or expected and claimed by California-married same-sex
couples-have the potential, as both Make Change and My Big Fat Straight
Wedding acknowledge, to facilitate further legal recognition. We have to
acknowledge that this would also be a change, of sorts - a change to the
lexicon, though not nearly of the magnitude of the aspirations to change
social practice of the feminist and queer critics of marriage equality. Even
as regards the normalizing aspiration of the mainstream marriage equality
movement, it remains an open question whether allowing same-sex couples
legal recognition will simply admit them to a persistent and pervasive
reaffirmation of conservative values,386 or will subtly destabilize the
naturalized gender and sexuality assumptions undergirding traditional
387marriage.
Whatever the frame one chooses to put on the activity, visible
participation by same-sex couples in the daily rituals of marriage evidences
a desire to be recognized as married by themselves and others. 388  This
recognition occurs socially, dramaturgically, if you will, within the
particular audiences and contexts in which same-sex couples live and move,
and perhaps eventually more broadly within transformed shared social
structures. 389 At some point the recognition then can occur legally, in a
formal way that formally redefines the boundaries of what marriage is, and
385. See Sullivan, supra note 303 (describing the personal impact of his own same-sex
marriage).
386. See generally, e.g., Kuykendall, supra note 226 (connecting traditional marriage
vows not just to traditional family but to an American democratic civic ideal); Polikoff, We
Will Get What We Ask For, supra note 329 (critiquing the notion that legal recognition of
same-sex marriage will destabilize the gendered structure of marriage); Sullivan, supra note
303 (expressing how personally enacting a traditional "marriage" with all the trappings
changed his perception of self and his interactions with others and the way they perceived
him).
387. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW
& SEXUALITY 9, 18 (1991) (arguing that legal recognition of same-sex marriage will
destabilize the gendered structure of marriage); Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 19
(describing the traditionalist concern with same-sex marriage as one of dilution or pollution
of a central cultural ritual, motivated in part by a concern to preserve traditional gender
roles).
388. See Franke, supra note 5, at 245 (discussing the desire for formal recognition
through kinship as a driving force in the same-sex marriage politics). Franke disapproves,
arguing that a freedom to be otherwise is lost when fitting in is the goal. Id.
389. See Kuykendall, supra note 226; Poirier, Cultural Property, supra note 19, at 383-
401 (discussing the social settings in which same-sex couples express desires to be
recognized as married).
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that recognizes there has already been a cultural shift. The marriage
controversy is not simply about uncovering authenticity, as Yoshino can be
read to suggest, but about producing a dialectic around the social
categories, the lexicon.
B. Claiming What?
I turn to Judith Butler for the last word. Butler's writing is difficult,390
her arguments have developed and shifted over time, 39' and she often uses
the language of continental theory, what the late Louise Halper frequently
referred to in conversation as the "advanced Frenchie stuff." I offer one
interpretation of part of one text, relevant and helpful in summing up the
themes advanced in this article.
Imitation and Gender Insubordination392 is a relatively early essay, in
which Butler questions whether one can or ought to define what it means to
be a lesbian.393  Butler reminds us that "identity categories tend to be
390. In a scathing 1999 review, Martha Nussbaum criticized Butler's poor writing,
among other things. Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22,
1999, at 37. Butler has responded that difficulty in her writing is intentional as a method for
forcing the reader to come to grips experientially with her points inter alia about meaning,
play, identity, and politics. She writes:
What concerns me is that the critical relation of ordinary grammar has been lost
in this call for radical accessibility. It's not that I'm in favor of difficulty for
difficulty's sake; it's that I think there is a lot in ordinary language and in
received grammar that constrains our thinking-indeed, about what a person is,
what a subject is, what gender is, what sexuality is, what politics can be-and
that I'm not sure we're going to be able to struggle effectively against those
constraints or work within them in a productive way unless we see the ways in
which grammar is both producing and constraining our sense of what the world
is.
Judith Butler, with Gary A. Olson and Lynn Worsham, Changing the Subject: Judith
Butler's Politics of Radical Resignification, in THE JUDITH BUTLER READER 325, 327-28
(Judith Butler & Sara Salih eds., 2004). See also id. at 356 (arguing that everyday grammar
and everyday language allow us to take for granted what qualifies as human). Butler, Olson,
and Worsham further argue that "[tiaking for granted one's own linguistic horizon as the
ultimate linguistic horizon leads to an enormous parochialis .... and closes us off from the
possibility of understanding others and ourselves in a more fundamentally capacious way."
Id.
391. See Yoshino, Covering (the article), supra note 9, at 319 (distinguishing two
different theories of performance and identity in two different works of Butler). For helpful
longitudinal assessments of Butler's work, see generally ELENA LoazIDou, JuDITH BUTLER:
ETHIcs, LAW, POLMCS (2007); SARAH SALIH, JUDITH BUTLER (2002).
392. Butler, supra note 1.
393. See id. at 13-14 (questioning whether one can or ought to define being a lesbian).
MICROPERFORMANCES OF IDENTITY
instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as the normalizing categories of
oppressive structures or as the rallying points for liberatory contestation of
that very oppression. ' 94 Identity categories are in fact sites of "necessary
trouble.' ' 95 Using the language of semiotics to describe this characteristic
problem of identity as applied to lesbianism, Butler writes that she "would
like to have it permanently unclear what precisely that sign [the mark of
being lesbian] signifies."396 Any theory that claims to define "lesbian" is
already political.397 This includes this discourse of academics seeking to
legitimate gay and lesbian studies, which was part of the explicit goal of the
conference that generated the anthology in which Butler's essay appeared,
circa 1990.398
Butler expressly focuses on the problem of seeking to contain
sexuality and eroticism within any identity category that would seek to
describe and authorize them.399 She could be read here to depict sexuality
and eroticism as having some special basic uncontainable and destabilizing
force. But her same argument around arbitrariness, shifting meanings, and
desire for control could be made with regard to other identity categories as
well, especially those involved in relations of dominance and
subordination.4° Butler argues that the person who is "out" as lesbian or
394. Id. at 13-14. In the same passage Butler refers generally to MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION (John Hurley trans., 1980)
(1976) for the general proposition that a particular homophobic discourse can be both a
restraint and a starting point for opposition. Id.
395. Id. at 14. This is undoubtedly a reference to the word "trouble" in the title of her
roughly contemporaneous work, JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 382.
396. Id. at 14.
397. Id. at 14-15.
398. See Acknowledgements, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES V
(Diana Fuss ed., 1991) (describing the emergence of an academic discipline of lesbian and
gay studies, as marked by a 1989 conference at Yale, at which most of the essays in the
volume were originally presented). Butler, I think somewhat mockingly, describes the
conference as about the professionalization of gayness. Butler, supra note 1, at 18.
399. Id. at 14.
400. In fact, in an essay contemporaneous to Imitation and Gender Insubordination,
Butler makes a strikingly similar argument about the category of "women." See Judith
Butler, Contingent Foundations and the Question of "Postmodernism", in FEMINISTS
THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 3 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992). Butler writes:
[A]ny effort to give universal or specific content to the category of women,
presuming that that guarantee of solidarity is required in advance, will
necessarily produce factionalization, and that "identity" as a point of departure
can never hold as the solidifying ground of a feminist political movement.
Identity categories are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as
such, exclusionary This is not to say that the term "women" ought not to be
used, or that we ought to announce the death of the category. On the contrary,
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gay is not in fact therefore free, but is subject to other forces that remain
concealed.40' As we have seen, the very ability to have, perform, and
experience an identity involves ongoing shared negotiation and
performance, which is always necessarily provisional. As Butler writes
with regard to claiming the identity of lesbian, "[i]t is always finally unclear
what is meant by invoking the lesbian-signifier, since its signification is
always to some degree out of one's control, but also because its specificity
can only be demarcated by exclusions that return to disrupt its claim to
coherence. ,402
This rather abstract statement can be made concrete by asking "[w]hat,
if anything, can lesbians be said to share?"'4°3 Here we are, in the territory
of sexl, gender, sexual orientation (which involves desire and sex2), and of
direct declaration and indirect performative gestures indicative of
identity.4°4 The identity "lesbian" is going to be contested not only by those
who stigmatize the identity, but among those who claim it, once they begin
to form a sense of collective identity with an ability to communicate and a
potential for political and cultural power.4°5 As Butler writes, it is "clear
the very term becomes a site of permanent openness and resignifiability ....
[T]he rifts among women over the content of the term ought to be safeguarded
and prized, indeed... this constant rifting ought to be affirmed as the
ungrounded ground of feminist theory.
Id. at 15-16. Butler also makes a similar argument in this essay as to "the subject"
generally. Id. at 12-14.
401. Id. at 15. Nor is Butler's concept here parallel to the struggle depicted by Yoshino
in COVERING (the book) for ever-greater authenticity. Rather, any identity is always
dialectical, caught between different potential interpretations and reformulations.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 15.
404. As Butler bluntly writes:
If a sexuality is to be disclosed, what will be taken as the true determinant of its
meaning: the phantasy structure, the act, the orifice, the gender, the anatomy?
And if the practice engages a complex interplay of all of those, which one of
[these] erotic dimensions will come to stand for the sexuality that requires them
all?
Butler, supra note 1, at 17.
405. To employ Fraser's helpful terminology, the "sense of collective identity" happens
once lesbians begin to form a "subaltern counterpublic." See Fraser, supra note 229, at 117-
24 (introducing the term "subaltern counterpublic"). As Fraser observes, subaltern
counterpublics are not always virtuous. They can be "explicitly antidemocratic and
antiegalitarian, and even those with democratic and egalitarian intentions are not always
above practicing their own modes of informal exclusion and marginalization." Id. at 124.
Like Butler, Fraser recognizes that any public will inevitably be shaped by internal currents
and involves "a plurality of perspectives among those who participate within it, thereby
allowing for internal differences and antagonisms and discouraging reified blocs." Id. at
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that there is no necessarily common element among lesbians, except
perhaps that we all know something about how homophobia works against
women-although, even then, the language and the analysis we use will
differ. "'4 6 There is no specificity to lesbian sexuality.4°7
Butler makes a second important point. Although identity terms such
as "lesbian" or "gay" cannot be transparent or full, they must still be used




These political uses raise the question of "which use will be legislated, and
what play will there be between legislation and use such that the
instrumental uses of 'identity' do not become regulatory imperatives.'W I
would say, using somewhat different terms from Butler's, that
counterpublics and counterdiscourses organized by specific political groups
are necessary, but at the same time problematic.41 ° One might for example
think of minority covering demands, such as Russell Robinson (among
others) has identified. 1
In terms of same-sex marriage, Butler's broad argument can be
understood to apply to the claims and maneuvers of subordinated groups
around how things ought to be, at the level of microperformances as well as
larger legal and lexical structures. In this light, Robin Shahar and the
Attorney General of Georgia, the lesbian couples seeking to rent the
beachfront Pavilion and the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, and
the LGBT advocacy groups that authored Make Change and their
127.
406. Butler, supra note 1, at 17.
407. See id. (describing the futility of efforts to give specific content to lesbian
experience).
408. Id. at 16.
409. Id.
410. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 229, at 120-23 (introducing the concept of subaltern
counterpublics). Fraser notes that the utility of "alternative publics" in which subordinated
social groups like gays and lesbians "formulate oppositional interpretations of their
identities, interests and needs" while questioning whether it is possible for these groups "to
deliberate as if they were social peers" when these "specially designated discursive
arenas .... are situated in a larger societal context .... pervaded by structural relations of
dominance and subordination .... Id. MICHAEL WARNER, Publics and Counterpublics, in
PUBLICS AND COUNTERPUBLICS 65, 117-21 (2002) (critiquing Fraser's concept of a
"subaltern counterpublic" and exploring various manifestations of counterpublics).
411. See Robinson, supra note 10, at 1819-26 (discussing minority-imposed covering).
Cf. Fraser, supra note 229, at 124 (arguing that subaltern counterpublics may be explicitly
antidemocratic and antiegalitarian, or may practice subtler modes of informal exclusion and
marginalization). Such processes would in turn result in pressures for passing and
covering-that is minority-imposed covering demands.
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counterpart marriage-traditionalist advocacy groups, are all engaged in
symmetrical and opposing attempts to regulate gay and lesbian identity in
various ways-including through regulation of the microperformances of
same-sex marriage by same-sex couples. As Janet Halley cautions, LGBT
legal reformers must invoke identity, but in doing so "they may approach
and even cross the dangerous line ... between advocacy and coercion."
412
A third important point in Butler's essay links the sense of identity
inextricably with the individual's participation in play about identity.413 I
hear here an echo of Goffman's dramaturgical approach. Butler asks:
How is it that I can both "be" [a lesbian], and yet endeavor to be one at
the same time? .... To say that I "play" at being one is not to say that I
am not one "really"; rather, how and where I play at being one is the
way in which that "being" gets established, instituted, circulated, and
confirmed. This is not a performance from which I can take a radical
distance .... 414
Butler describes this identity play as "deep-seated" and "psychically
entrenched" and not experienced as a mere role.415
A thoroughgoing theory of social construction of identity can
accommodate such an idea.41 6 As sociologist Stevi Jackson writes, we need
not conceive of a prediscursive "I", but only an "I" that is "the fleeting
mobilization of a socially constituted self. This self is not a fixed structure
but is always 'in process' by virtue of its constant reflexivity. ,417 Similarly,
Butler argues that "the 'I' is a site of repetition.... the 'I' only achieves the
semblance of identity through a certain repetition of itself .... ,,418 The very
category constituted by repetition is necessarily unstable. 419  This
observation is true not just of identity categories such as gender and sexual
orientation, but also of the underlying "person" or self to whom we attribute
412. Halley, supra note 315, at 118.
413. Butler, supra note 1, at 18.
414. Id. at 18.
415. Id. She writes, "[Tihis 'I' does not play lesbianism as its role." (emphasis
omitted). Id.
416. See Jackson, supra note 21, at 18-19 (describing four intersecting levels of social
construction: the structural or social; meaning, encompassing the meanings negotiated in
everyday life; routine everyday social practices; and subjectivity, "through which we
experience desires and emotions and make sense of ourselves as embodied gendered and
sexual beings").
417. Id. at 31 (referencing G.H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (1934)).
418. Butler, supra note 1, at 18.
419. See id. ("[I]t is precisely the repetition of that play that establishes as well the
instability of the very category that it constitutes.").
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these identity characteristics. Butler writes that the "I" is always
"permanently non-self-identical.', 420  A mouthful of a term, to be sure, but
accurate. "What 'performs' does not exhaust the 'I'; it does not lay out in
visible terms the comprehensive content of that 'I,' for if the performance is
'repeated,' there is always the question of what differentiates from each
other the moments of identity that are repeated. '421 Moreover, "there is no
'I' that precedes the gender that it is said to perform; the repetition, and the
failure to repeat, produce strings of performances that constitute and contest
the coherence of that 'I.' ' '422 This understanding exposes heterosexuality,
among other characteristics, as "perpetually at risk. '423 It also suggests that
claims made for heterosexuality being "natural" are a defense against its
being-if not "undone" as Butler argues424-at least done quite
differently.425 As Stevi Jackson writes, because we are constantly "doing
gender" in a set of complex interpretational processes, "gender and
420. Id.
421. Id.; see id. at 24 (stressing that she is not denying that there is a subject; but
instead challenging the idea that the subject exists prior to its expression). "[Glender is not a
performance that a prior subject elects to do, but gender is performative in the sense that it
constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears to express." Id.
422. Id. at 18.
423. d. at 23.
424. Id. The term resonates with the title of her later book, JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING
GENDER (2004).
425. Feminist theory considers it important to address the naturalization or
essentialization of gender categories. If gender is understood as socially constructed, then
current norms are contestable because they are less than inevitable. See, e.g., Poirier,
Hastening the Kulturkampf, supra note 142, at 303-06 (discussing the theoretical argument
for dessentializing gender, with reference to BEM, supra note 28; BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE, supra note 382; BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATrER, supra note 382; and Valdes,
supra note 21); Ramachandran, supra note 189, at 218 (reading Butler to say that the
problem is not identity but the naturalization of identity). There seems to me to be an
evident link between this feminist notion of destabilizing structures of dominance and
subordination through denaturalizing social structures and the process of using
microinteractions to challenging tacit assumptions about identity, as explored in the works of
Goffman, Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock, and Gusfield discussed supra Part II.A, see text at
notes 6, 71-72 & 98. This important set of correspondences in the theory of social
movements and of the social construction of identity will have to await another occasion for
fuller examination.
Traditionalist understandings of marriage often resort to the rhetoric of nature and
essence. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, supra note 40, at 266 (marriage is "pre-political")
and id. at 267-68 (marriage is "rooted in realistic understandings of human nature and the
consequences of sex difference.").
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normative heterosexuality are constantly reaffirmed, but it is also here that
their meanings can be unsettled or renegotiated.,
426
The matter of inherent and inevitable instability of identity returns us
to another political question. Butler asks whether it is not politically risky
to expose this basic instability of lesbian and gay identities, when they are
427already threatened with obliteration. Might it not be better to act as
though the categories were natural and stable, and not provisional? Butler
can be read to suggest not that there should be no policing of gender
categories, but rather that whatever category is being advanced politically
should also be '!made to account for what it excludes. ''428 She asks how we
can use an identity sign effectively politically now, for the time being,
without foreclosing possible future significations that are different.429 Here
Butler's concern resonates with that of others on the feminist left and the
queer left about the traditionalist normativity of the marriage equality
movement; I have earlier identified Katherine Franke, Ruthann Robson, and
Nancy Polikoff, for the feminists, and Michael Warner for the queer, and
they will stand in for many others.4 3 ° Make Change is only one example of
the mainstream LGBT movement's naturalizing reliance on existing diffuse
social structures to deliver the political goods-goods that consist not of
benefits (as required by Baker v. State431 and Lewis v. Harris432)-but of a
433more available traditional identity. The marriage equality movement is
driven by a widely shared desire for access to an assimilative, normalizing
identity process around kinship categories that derive from what is known
as marriage.434 For the most part the mainstream LGBT movement's theory
426. Jackson, supra note 21, at 29.
427. See Butler, supra note 1, at 19 ("There is no question that gays and lesbians are
threatened by the violence of public erasure .....
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. See generally Franke, supra note 5; Robson, supra note 330; Polikoff, We Will Get
What We Ask For, supra note 329, and text accompanying notes 382-393.
431. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (requiring the state to provide same-sex couples the
benefits of marriage, but leaving up to the legislature whether to call the legally-recognized
status of same-sex couples "marriage" or something else).
432. 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (requiring the state to provide same-sex couples the
benefits of marriage, but leaving up to the legislature whether to call the legally-recognized
status of same-sex couples "marriage" or something else).
433. See Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in the "Civil
Union"rMarriage" Distinction, CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing the stigmatic
injury in providing a separate name for legally recognized same-sex relationships while at
the same time providing all the same benefits as opposite-sex "marriage").
434. See Polikoff, supra note 329, at 184 (arguing that advocates of same-sex marriage
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and praxis simply do not leave room for a future troubling of that identity
process.4 35
Butler would prescribe a somewhat different course: "In avowing the
sign's strategic provisionality (rather than its strategic essentialism), that
identity can become a site of contest and revision, indeed, take on a future
set of significations that those of us who use it now may not be able to
foresee. ''436 As Butler writes in another essay, specifically about same-sex
marriage,
[L]egitimation is double-edged: it is crucial that, politically, we lay
claim to intelligibility and recognizability; and it is crucial, politically,
that we maintain a critical and transformative relation to the norms that
govern what will and will not count as an intelligible and recognizable
alliance and kinship. This latter would also involve a critical relation to
the desire for legitimation as such.
4 37
So "Butler promotes gender trouble, rather than freedom from
gender. ',438 Perhaps, as to marriage, the feminist left and queer left will be
able to propose recognizable alternatives. If the alternatives are not
recognizable as marriage, however, the alternatives will not confer the
kinship, status, and microinteraction-based identity that marriage does, and
will arguably therefore fall short of goals that might well be expressed as
dignity and equality.439 For, as this article has shown, these experiences
depend in significant part on microinteractions of interpersonal recognition.
Meanwhile, the Robin Shahars and Andrew Sulivans of the marriage
equality movement, as dependent as they are on misappropriation and
transgressive microperformances of a traditional kinship form, at the very
same time seek the stability and identity of normalizing and already widely
shared understood kinship categories, which they wish to experience as
theirs also. They sincerely do not want "trouble" in Butler's sense. They
would not wish to acknowledge (nor as a political matter could the marriage
who rely upon normative arguments tend "to paint a picture of marriage that is almost
identical to marriage as currently constructed in society...").
435. Not coincidentally, the assertion of a particular normalizing position also tends to
foreclose questioning of these groups' authority to determine the contents of that position.
436. Butler, supra note 1, at 19.
437. JUDITH BUTLER, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in UNDOING GENDER
117 (2004).
438. Ramachandran, supra note 189, at 219. By this Ramachandran means "the
capacity to experiment with, challenge, and trouble social norms and roles." Id.
439. The problem of achieving sufficient recognition for alternatives to marriage to
establish the underlying goals of equality or dignity is a topic of my ongoing research. See
generally Poirier, Name Calling, supra note 433.
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equality movement purvey as a goal for its adherents)440 the idea that
identity categories-of sex, gender, sexual orientation, and of married
status-still leave us inevitably betwixt and between.
440. See Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social
Constructionism, in FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 239, 258 (Edward Stein ed., 1990) (arguing that a
constructionist understanding of gay and lesbian identity does not agree with the self-
understanding of many gay and lesbian folks, and poses a threat the concept of legitimation
through belonging to a group).
